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The literature on the benefits and costs of financial globalization for developing countries has
exploded in recent years, but along many disparate channels and with a variety of apparently 
conflicting results. For instance, there is still little robust evidence of the growth benefits of 
broad capital account liberalization, but a number of recent papers in the finance literature 
report that equity market liberalizations do significantly boost growth. Similarly, evidence 
based on microeconomic (firm- or industry-level) data shows some benefits of financial 
integration and the distortionary effects of capital controls, while the macroeconomic 
evidence remains inconclusive. We attempt to provide a unified conceptual framework for 
organizing this vast and growing literature. This framework allows us to provide a fresh 
synthetic perspective on the macroeconomic effects of financial globalization, in terms of 
both growth and volatility. Overall, our critical reading of the recent empirical literature is 
that it lends some qualified support to the view that developing countries can benefit from 
financial globalization, but with many nuances. On the other hand, there is little systematic 
evidence to support widely cited claims that financial globalization by itself leads to deeper 
and more costly developing country growth crises. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This paper attempts to provide a unified conceptual framework for organizing the vast 
literature about the costs and benefits of financial globalization. Can developing countries 
benefit from financial globalization? Yes, but with many nuances. Does financial 
globalization by itself lead to economic crises? Almost certainly no! The bottom line is that 
some of the extreme polemic claims made about the effects of financial globalization on 
developing countries, both pro and con, are far less easy to substantiate than either side 
generally cares to admit. 
 
The framework we present provides a fresh synthetic perspective on the macroeconomic 
effects of financial globalization, both in terms of growth and volatility. The main points are 
as follows: 
 
•  The majority of empirical studies are unable to find robust evidence in support of the 
growth benefits of capital account liberalization. However, studies that use measures 
of de facto integration or finer measures of de jure integration tend to find more 
positive results. More importantly, studies using micro data are better able to detect 
the growth and productivity gains stemming from financial integration. 
•  There is little formal empirical evidence to support the oft-cited claims that financial 
globalization in and of itself is responsible for the spate of financial crises that the 
world has seen over the last three decades. 
•  The conceptual framework we present suggests that in addition to the traditional 
channels (e.g., capital accumulation), the growth and stability benefits of financial 
globalization are also realized through a broad set of “collateral benefits” (see Figure 
A). These collateral benefits affect growth and stability dynamics indirectly, implying 
that the associated macroeconomic gains may not be fully evident in the short run and 
may be difficult to uncover in cross-country regressions. 
•  Various threshold effects play important roles in shaping the macroeconomic 
outcomes of financial globalization (see Figure B). Countries meeting these threshold 
conditions are better able to reap the growth and stability benefits of financial 
globalization. 
•  The framework also points to a fundamental tension between the costs and benefits of 
financial globalization that may be difficult to avoid. Financial globalization appears 
to have the potential to play a catalytic role in generating an array of collateral 
benefits that may help boost long-run growth. At the same time, premature opening of 
the capital account in the absence of some basic supporting conditions can delay the 
realization of these benefits, while making a country more vulnerable to sudden stops 
of capital flows.   - 5 -   
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
The recent wave of financial globalization got started in earnest in the mid-1980s, with rising 
cross-border financial flows among industrial economies and between industrial and 
developing economies. This was spurred by liberalization of capital controls in many of these 
countries, in anticipation of the benefits that cross-border flows would bring in terms of 
better global allocation of capital and improved international risk-sharing possibilities. The 
strong presumption was that these benefits ought to be large, especially for developing 
countries that tend to be relatively capital-poor and have more volatile income growth. 
 
With the surge in financial flows, however, came a spate of currency and financial crises in 
the late 1980s and 1990s. There is a widely held perception that developing countries that 
opened up to capital flows have been more vulnerable to these crises than industrial 
economies, and have been much more adversely affected. These developments have sparked 
a fierce debate among both academics and practitioners on the costs and benefits of financial 
globalization. This debate has intensified and become more polarized over time, in contrast 
to the debate on trade liberalization, which has more or less moved toward a consensus.
2  
 
Some academic economists view increasing capital account liberalization and unfettered 
capital flows as a serious impediment to global financial stability (e.g., Rodrik, 1998; 
Bhagwati, 1998; Stiglitz, 2002), leading to calls for capital controls and the imposition of 
frictions, such as “Tobin taxes,” on international asset trade. Others argue that increased 
openness to capital flows has, by and large, proven essential for countries aiming to upgrade 
from lower- to middle-income status, while significantly enhancing stability among 
industrialized countries (e.g., Fischer, 1998; Summers, 2000). This is clearly a matter of 
considerable policy relevance, especially with major economies like China and India recently 
taking steps to open up their capital accounts. Although consensus may be too much to hope 
for, some clarity on what theory and data do tell us—and what they do not tell us—is 
important for informing the ongoing debate.  
 
A central conclusion of this paper is that although the rapidly-growing empirical literature is 
gradually tilting toward supporting a significant positive role for financial globalization, there 
are many unanswered questions about how a country should organize and pace its move. At 
the same time, we find there is very little meaningful empirical support to underpin the more 
polemical claims of those who argue that capital account liberalizations (as opposed to, say, 
inappropriately rigid exchange rate regimes) are the root problem underlying most 
developing country financial crises of the past fifteen years. We hope, in this paper, to 
provide a synthetic perspective on this literature so the reader may judge for herself. At the 
same time, we try to develop a few organizing principles that will perhaps point the way to 
where future research is most needed.  
                                                 
2 For empirical evidence showing that trade openness has a direct and positive effect on economic 
growth, see, for example, Frankel and Romer (1999) and Dollar and Kraay (2003). Rodriguez and 
Rodrik (2002) present a contrarian view, but, as summarized in recent surveys by Berg and Krueger 
(2003), Baldwin (2004), and Winters (2004), the weight of the evidence supports the by-now 
conventional wisdom that trade is good for growth.   - 8 -   
The fundamental point we make in this paper is that the main benefits from successful 
financial globalization are probably catalytic and indirect, rather than consisting simply of 
enhanced access to financing for domestic investment. Of course, this perspective differs 
from the standard neoclassical framework, which views the key benefit of financial 
globalization as arising from long-term net flows of capital from industrial to developing 
economies. Since the former group of countries is capital rich while the latter is relatively 
capital poor, this would generate welfare gains for both groups of countries. Yet a survey of 
the literature on capital account liberalization by Eichengreen (2001) concludes that there is 
no empirical substantiation of the conventional theoretical tenets about the growth benefits of 
capital account liberalization.  
 
A subsequent survey by us (Prasad, Rogoff, Wei, and Kose, 2003) on the broader dimensions 
of financial globalization deepens the puzzle. Even after taking into account the fundamental 
distinction between de jure and de facto financial globalization (which we shall discuss later 
in this paper), we still conclude that, taken as a whole, the vast empirical literature provides 
little robust evidence of a causal relationship between financial integration and growth. 
Moreover, we find that, among developing countries, the volatility of consumption growth 
relative to income growth appears to be positively associated with financial integration, the 
opposite of what canonical theoretical models would predict. In theory, access to 
international markets should allow all countries to smooth consumption by insuring against 
country-specific income risk. What accounts for these discrepancies between the advertised 
benefits of financial globalization and the mixed empirical evidence?
3     
 
We argue here that far more important than the direct growth effects of access to more capital 
is how capital flows generate a number of what we label the “potential collateral benefits” of 
financial integration. There is now a rapidly growing literature showing that financial 
openness can—in many but not all circumstances—promote development of the domestic 
financial sector, impose discipline on macroeconomic policies, generate efficiency gains 
among domestic firms by exposing them to competition from foreign entrants, and unleash 
forces that result in better government and corporate governance.  
 
The notion that financial globalization mainly influences growth through indirect channels 
has important implications for empirical analysis of its benefits. For one thing, building 
institutions, enhancing market discipline, and deepening the financial sector takes time, and 
so does the realization of growth benefits through such channels. This may explain why, over 
relatively short periods, it seems much easier to detect the costs but not the benefits of 
financial globalization. More fundamentally, even at long horizons, it may be difficult to 
detect the productivity-enhancing benefits of financial globalization in empirical work if one 
includes structural, institutional, and macroeconomic policy variables in cross-country 
regressions that attempt to explain growth of GDP or productivity. For then, by construction, 
there can be little added explanatory power left for the financial openness measure. Indeed, 
this could explain why simple correlations tend to show that financially integrated economies 
                                                 
3 We emphasize up front that our analysis focuses largely on private capital flows and does not 
encompass the effects of official flows, including foreign aid, and other flows, such as remittances 
(which should, strictly speaking, appear in the current account of the balance of payments).   - 9 -   
have higher growth rates, on average, than less integrated economies, yet it has proven 
difficult to find a causal effect of financial integration on growth once the other factors 
mentioned previously are controlled for.  
 
The approach we have outlined above helps to link a number of other pieces of the literature. 
For instance, a majority of the papers looking at the effects of overall capital account 
liberalization have relied on de jure measures of capital account openness, which reflect legal 
restrictions on capital movements (or lack thereof). But the collateral benefits are likely to be 
realized at least as much through de facto integration, which, as we show, can be quite 
different. In practice, the distinction between de jure and de facto openness can be very 
important. Many countries have capital controls that are quite strict on paper but toothless in 
practice, so their de facto level of integration—as measured by capital flows or stocks of 
foreign assets and liabilities—is quite high; this, in itself, could act as a disciplining device 
on the government and firms. In contrast, many other countries are quite open to global 
capital markets on a de jure basis, but in practice capital flows are minimal. In our survey, we 
consider results based on both kinds of measures and argue that the choice of measure has 
important consequences for empirical analysis.  
 
Our approach could help understand why recent research that focuses on the growth effects 
of equity market liberalizations seems to find such strong positive effects despite the fact that 
portfolio equity inflows are typically small relative to other types of flows. For instance, one 
possibility is that equity market liberalizations typically take place in tandem with various 
other domestic reforms and when national governments have confidence in their own ability 
to adequately supervise domestic financial markets. Besides, equity inflows are precisely the 
ones that, along with foreign direct investment (FDI), are most likely to confer the sort of 
collateral benefits discussed earlier. Our analysis may help explain why there is much 
stronger evidence based on microeconomic (firm- or industry-level) data on the distortionary 
effects of capital controls and the benefits of capital account liberalization.  
 
The collateral benefits perspective also ties in with the literature on thresholds in the effects 
of financial globalization. It has become a mantra in academic and policy circles that 
financial globalization can in principle, be good for any country—in terms of delivering the 
benefits and minimizing the risks—but that the benefits-to-cost calculus is much more 
compelling for countries with robust institutions and good macroeconomic policies. The set 
of prescribed requirements tends to be vast—encompassing sound monetary and fiscal 
policies, depth and sophistication of financial markets, the quality of financial sector 
regulation and supervision, transparency and good governance, and so on.  
 
Most developing countries clearly do not measure up to all of these desiderata, and, for many 
of them, the length of this list makes things look hopeless at the outset. Does this imply that 
developing countries would do best to shield themselves from external influences while 
trying to improve the quality of their domestic policies and institutions to attain some 
acceptable level? The academic literature we survey does not seem to offer a simple answer, 
in part because the links are bidirectional. In theory (and with some supporting evidence, as 
we shall see), financial opening may, in fact, play an important catalytic role in improving 
institutions, allowing for transfer of good governance practices, strengthening 
macroeconomic discipline, and so on. But there remain a number of unresolved questions in   - 10 -   
the literature that make it difficult to draw firm policy conclusions. We list some of these 
questions that require further research in the final section of the paper. 
 
II.   A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THEORY 
We begin with a very brief review of the basic implications from theoretical models about 
how financial globalization should affect growth, volatility, and comovement of output and 
consumption.  
 
A.   Growth 
As we have already noted, the simplest benchmark one-sector neoclassical framework 
suggests that financial globalization should lead to flows of capital from capital-rich 
economies to capital-poor economies since, in the latter, the returns to capital should be 
higher.
4 These flows should complement limited domestic saving in capital-poor economies 
and, by reducing the cost of capital, allow for increased investment. Certain types of financial 
flows could also generate technology spillovers and serve as a conduit for imbibing 
managerial and other forms of organizational expertise from more advanced economies.  
 
There are also a number of indirect channels through which financial globalization could 
enhance growth. It could help promote specialization by allowing for sharing of income risk, 
which could in turn increase productivity and growth as well.
5 Financial flows could foster 
development of the domestic financial sector and, by imposing discipline on macroeconomic 
policies, lead to more stable policies. We discuss the mechanisms and evidence for some of 
these channels later in the paper.  
 
B.   Volatility 
The effects of financial integration on output volatility are not obvious in theory. In principle, 
financial integration allows capital-poor countries to diversify away from their narrow 
production bases that are often agricultural or natural resource-dependent. This should reduce 
macroeconomic volatility. At a more advanced stage of development, however, trade and 
financial integration could simultaneously allow for enhanced specialization based on 
                                                 
4 Indeed, the fact that the actual volumes of such flows do not come anywhere near what might be 
predicted by neoclassical growth models has been characterized as a puzzle by Lucas (1990), with 
many subsequent papers trying to resolve this puzzle. 
5 Concerns about increases in volatility that may result from a specialized production structure could 
discourage countries from taking up growth-enhancing specialization activities; higher volatility 
might also reduce investment rates. Financial globalization could facilitate international risk sharing 
and thereby reduce countries’ consumption volatility. Among developed countries and across regions 
within developed countries, better risk sharing appears to be associated with greater specialization 
(Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 1997; Obstfeld, 1994; and Kalemi-Ozcan, Sorensen, and Yosha, 2001).    - 11 -   
comparative advantage considerations. This could make countries more vulnerable to 
industry-specific shocks.
6  
 
Theory does have a strong prediction, however, about the relationship between financial 
integration and consumption volatility. Since consumers and, by extension, economies are 
risk-averse, consumption theory tells us that they should desire to use financial markets to 
insure against income risk, thereby smoothing the effects of temporary idiosyncratic 
fluctuations in income growth on consumption growth. In theory, the benefits of international 
risk-sharing could be quite large (Lewis, 1999; van Wincoop, 1999). But this issue is far 
from settled (see the discussion in Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2004, Chapter 5). Lucas’s (1987) 
claim that macroeconomic stabilization policies that reduce consumption volatility can have 
only minimal welfare benefits continues to be influential (see Barlevy, 2004). Some authors 
have shown that, even within Lucas’s framework, the higher volatility that developing 
countries experience implies that they can potentially reap large benefits from international 
risk-sharing arrangements (Pallage and Robe, 2003) 
 
C.   Comovement 
Another prediction of theory, related to the consumption smoothing issue, concerns the cross-
country comovement of major macroeconomic aggregates. In theory, the effect of increased 
financial integration on cross-country correlations of output growth is uncertain, since it 
depends on the nature of shocks and specialization patterns. In any case, financial integration 
should in theory help countries diversify away country-specific risk and should, therefore, 
result in stronger comovement of consumption growth across countries. Thus, in parallel to 
the discussion of volatility, economic theory has clear implications for how financial 
integration should affect cross-country consumption correlations but not for correlations of 
output or income.  
 
In summary, there is a strong presumption in theory that financial integration is good for 
growth and, although its effects on output volatility are unclear, it should unambiguously 
lead to reductions in the relative volatility of consumption (and increase the cross-country 
comovement of fluctuations in consumption). 
 
                                                 
6 See Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2004) for a more detailed exposition. Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) 
show that the degree of diversification has an inverted U-shaped relationship with per capita income 
level. The relationship between financial openness and macroeconomic volatility could also be 
affected by certain features of developing countries that may make them more vulnerable to external 
shocks. First, the limited diversification of their exports and imports could make them susceptible to 
terms of trade and foreign demand shocks (Kose, 2002). Second, sharp changes in world interest rates 
might induce large fluctuations in highly indebted countries (Blankenau, Kose, and Yi, 2001; 
Neumeyer and Perri, 2005). Third, country size is an important factor as external shocks have a larger 
impact on volatility in small open developing countries (Crucini, 1997).    - 12 -   
III.   MEASURING FINANCIAL OPENNESS 
The traditional approach to measuring financial openness is to use measures of legal 
restrictions on cross-border capital flows. Such capital controls come in many varieties 
(controls on inflows versus controls on outflows, quantity controls versus price controls, 
restrictions on foreign equity holdings, etc.). Indeed, the IMF’s widely used Annual Report 
on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) measures over 60 
different types of controls. Appendix I summarizes the different categories of restrictions in 
the AREAER and shows how wide-ranging these controls can be.  
 
One issue in the literature is whether to use a 0/1 measure of capital account openness (as in, 
say, the well-known work of Rodrik, 1998) or a finer measure (as pioneered by Quinn, 
1997). Another question is whether to stick with using one of these types of de jure measures 
(as most of the literature does) or look for alternatives. It is worth noting that the range of 
available de jure measures is not as broad as it may seem since most of them, in one way or 
another, essentially just summarize the information in the IMF’s AREAER reports. 
 
An alternative approach (advocated, for example, in Prasad, Rogoff, Wei, and Kose, 2003) is 
to use a de facto measure that tries to take into account how much a country is integrated into 
international capital markets in practice. We will argue in this section that there is important 
information in both the de jure and de facto measures, but that for many applications the 
de facto measure is more suitable. The availability of a de facto integration measure that is 
consistently defined across countries owes a great deal to the pioneering work of Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti, which we discuss in greater detail below. 
 
A.   De Jure Measures Based on IMF Indicators 
Measuring capital account openness has long been a challenge (see Edison and others, 2004). 
Some researchers utilize the summary information provided by the AREAER to construct a 
“share” measure, reflecting the fraction of years in the sample in which a country’s capital 
account was open (see Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti, 1995; Rodrik, 1998; and Klein and Olivei, 
2006). Quinn (1997, 2003) use the narrative descriptions in the AREAER to develop a 
quantitative measure of capital account openness. Raising the level of technical 
sophistication a notch, Chinn and Ito (2005) develop an index of financial openness based on 
principal components extracted from disaggregated capital and current account restriction 
measures in the AREAER. Mody and Murshid (2005) also utilize the measures involving 
restrictions on capital and current account transactions and construct a different measure. 
Edwards (2005) combines the measures in Mody and Murshid (2005) and Chinn and Ito 
(2005) with information from country-specific data sources and proposes a new index.
7 After 
the expansion of the set of categories reflecting the existence of capital controls in the 1997 
issue of the AREAER, there have been some refinements of the earlier measures (see 
Johnston and Tamirisa, 1998, and Miniane, 2004). 
                                                 
7 Edison and Warnock (2003) construct measures of capital account restrictions related to just equity 
flows. Bekaert and Harvey (2000) and Henry (2000a) compile dates of equity market liberalizations 
for developing countries. We discuss some of these narrower measures in more detail later.   - 13 -   
B.   Shortcomings of De Jure Measures 
All of these measures, despite their increasing sophistication and fineness, suffer from a 
variety of similar shortcomings. First, they do not accurately reflect the degree of openness of 
the capital account because they are partially based on various restrictions associated with 
foreign exchange transactions that may not necessarily impede capital flows. Second, they do 
not capture the degree of enforcement of capital controls (or the effectiveness of that 
enforcement), which can change over time even if the legal restrictions themselves remain 
unchanged.
8 Third, and most importantly, these measures do not always reflect the actual 
degree of integration of an economy into international capital markets, as we have already 
noted. As another example, China, despite its extensive regime of capital controls, has not 
been able to stop inflows of speculative capital in recent years (see Prasad and Wei, 2007).  
 
A further complication is that, despite the extensive coverage of the IMF’s annual AREAER 
publication, there could be other regulations that effectively act as capital controls but are not 
counted as controls. For instance, prudential regulations that limit the foreign exchange 
exposure of domestic banks could, under certain circumstances, have the same effect as 
capital controls. 
 
This discussion suggests that the distinction between de jure and de facto financial 
integration is a crucial one. After all, what matters in analyzing the effects of financial 
globalization, is not how integrated economies seem on paper but how integrated they are in 
practice.
9 But how does one go about measuring de facto integration? 
 
C.   De Facto Measures Based on Price Differentials 
One approach has been to look at price-based measures of asset market integration. The logic 
is that, irrespective of the volume and direction of flows, true integration of capital markets 
should be reflected in common prices of similar financial instruments across national 
borders.
10 While the logic is sound, there are serious practical problems in using such 
                                                 
8 Edwards (2005) notes that binary measures suggest similar levels of capital account restrictiveness 
in Chile, Mexico, and Brazil during the period 1992–94. In fact, Mexico had a rather open capital 
account, Brazil employed a complex set of controls on capital flows, and there were some controls on 
short-term flows in Chile. 
9 Collins (2005) argues that de facto and de jure measures are both relevant in measuring the effects 
of financial integration. She also notes that de facto indicators are likely to be endogenous in growth 
regressions, making it difficult to pin down causal effects. As we discuss below, de jure measures also 
have a strong element of endogeneity to them, in addition to their various other deficiencies. 
Aizenman and Noy (2006) report that de jure measures of capital account liberalization have 
differential effects on de facto measures of trade and financial integration. They find that de jure 
restrictions on current account transactions adversely affect the extent of de facto trade openness 
while de jure restrictions on capital account transactions have no impact on de facto financial 
integration. Similarly, Magud and Reinhart (2006) survey a number of studies on the effectiveness of 
capital controls and conclude that controls on inflows do not reduce the volume of net flows.  
10 This is of course a simplistic description of a sophisticated approach (see Karolyi and Stulz, 2003, 
for a survey).   - 14 -   
measures for emerging markets and even more so for low-income developing economies. 
Returns on financial instruments in these economies may incorporate a multitude of risk and 
liquidity premia that are difficult to quantify. For example, stocks of firms in many emerging 
market economies trade at low price earnings ratios due to investor concerns about corporate 
governance and contract problems. Yet, it is not easy to separate this form of segmentation 
from differential pricing due to high project risk. In general, domestic financial markets may 
simply not be deep or liquid enough to allow for efficient arbitrage of price differentials.  
 
Other measures of capital market integration include saving-investment correlations and, 
related to the price-based approach discussed above, various interest parity conditions (see 
Frankel, 1992; and Edison, Klein, Ricci, and Sløk, 2002). However, these measures are also 
difficult to interpret and to operationalize for an extended period of time and for a large 
group of countries.  
 
D.   De Facto Measures Based on Quantities 
This leaves quantity-based measures of integration based on actual flows which, in our view, 
provide the best available measure of a country’s integration with international financial 
markets. One issue is whether to measure integration using net or gross capital flows. Gross 
flows provide a relatively less volatile and more sensible picture of integration. Indeed, this 
measure has the advantage of capturing two-way flows which one would expect to see if 
economies were in fact sharing risk efficiently in a world with multiple financial instruments 
and agents with different risk profiles. Using the sum of gross inflows and outflows as a ratio 
to national GDP also yields a nice symmetry with the widely-used measure of trade 
openness, which is the sum of imports and exports as a ratio to GDP.  
 
However, such annual flows tend to be quite volatile and are prone to measurement error. To 
mitigate these problems, it may be preferable to use a measure of the sum of gross stocks of 
foreign assets and liabilities as a ratio to GDP. These stocks are essentially just a refined 
cumulated version of the underlying flows corrected for valuation effects. This preserves the 
spirit of measuring de facto integration and obviates many of the problems associated with 
flow data. Moreover, for some purposes—particularly risk sharing—the stock measures are 
clearly more appropriate. For instance, if countries have large gross stocks of assets and 
liabilities, small exchange rate changes can have large valuation effects and serve as a 
mechanism for risk-sharing even if net asset positions are small.  
 
The measures of financial integration that we use in the next section draw upon the work of 
Milesi-Ferretti and Lane (2006). These authors have carefully constructed an extensive 
dataset of stocks of gross liabilities and assets for 145 countries covering the period 1970–
2004.
11 Their dataset contains information about the composition of international financial 
                                                 
11 In this paper, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti substantially extend their widely-used External Wealth of 
Nations database (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2001) by employing a revised methodology and utilizing 
a larger set of sources. While their benchmark series are based on the official estimates from the 
International Investment Position, they compute the stock positions for earlier years using data on 
capital flows and account for capital gains and losses. In a series of papers, they analyze the various 
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positions, including foreign direct investment, portfolio equity investment, external debt, and 
official reserves. In addition, the dataset has the virtue of accounting for valuation effects and 
other problems that typically plague raw country-level data, and also corrects for cross-
country differences in data definitions and variable construction.  
 
IV.   PATTERNS OF FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION 
Measures of de facto integration based on the Lane—Milesi-Ferretti data show a surge in 
financial globalization over the last two decades. Emerging markets have accounted for the 
lion’s share of inflows to developing economies. This is of course not a surprise since their 
level of integration into financial markets is the main ex-post criterion used to define 
emerging markets—the point to note here is that only a relatively small group of developing 
economies has actively participated in the process of financial globalization. FDI and 
portfolio equity flows have become the dominant form of new flows into developing 
economies, with the relative importance of debt flows declining over time (although, as we 
shall see, debt still accounts for more than half the stock of all external liabilities.)  
 
A.   Evolution of Financial Globalization Across Different Country Groups 
Figure 1 shows the absolute level of integration of different country groups into global 
financial markets, calculated as the sum of gross international financial assets and liabilities.
12 
While the level of integration into global capital markets is clearly highest for advanced 
economies, emerging market economies have accounted for the bulk of the integration 
experienced by developing economies in terms of the accumulation of foreign liabilities 
through capital inflows (Figure 2). Of the total stock of outstanding foreign liabilities at the 
end of 2004, industrial countries accounted for 91 percent and emerging markets for 
8 percent. Both figures show that the recent wave of financial globalization really got started 
in earnest only in the mid-1980s.
13  
 
Figure 3 compares the evolution of de jure integration based on the IMF’s binary capital 
account restrictiveness measure, averaged across all countries in each group, and 
corresponding group averages of the de facto financial openness measure (stock of 
international financial assets and liabilities expressed as a ratio to GDP). By both measures, 
advanced economies have become substantially integrated into global financial markets. For 
emerging market economies, average de jure openness has not changed much based on the 
IMF measure, but de facto integration has increased sharply over the last two decades. For 
other developing economies, de jure openness on average rose sharply over the last decade, 
to a level higher than that for emerging market economies, but the de facto measure has 
                                                                                                                                                       
features of the data and document the implications of changes in external asset positions for exchange 
rates, financial integration, and global imbalances (see Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2002, 2003, 2005).  
12 The sample of countries used in our analysis is listed in the Data Appendix. 
13 A much earlier wave of financial globalization, which took place between 1880 and 1914, has been 
analyzed by Bordo, Taylor, and Williamson (2003); Obstfeld and Taylor (2004); and Mauro, 
Sussman, and Yafeh (2006).   - 16 -   
stayed flat over this period. This figure highlights the different informational content in the 
two types of integration measures and the importance of taking these differences into account 
in analyses of the effects of financial globalization.   
 
B.   Composition of Stocks and Flows 
Table 1 shows that the share of debt in gross stocks of foreign assets and liabilities has 
declined from 75 percent in 1980–84 to 59 percent in 2000–2004. Among advanced 
economies, the biggest increase has been in the share of portfolio equity. For emerging 
markets, the share of FDI and portfolio equity has risen from a total of 13 percent in 1980–84 
to 37 percent in 2000–2004. In recent years, accumulation of official international reserves 
has accounted for a significant portion of the increase in gross foreign assets of emerging and 
other developing economies; consequently, the share of the “other” category has jumped over 
the last decade. 
 
Some of these patterns are even stronger when one looks at gross inflows (rather than total 
stocks of assets and liabilities). Table 2 shows that, while debt financing remains the most 
important source of inflows for advanced economies, FDI now accounts for almost half of 
total inflows into developing economies. Equity flows have become quite important for 
emerging markets, accounting for almost 12 percent of inflows, while this category still 
remains virtually non-existent for other developing economies, reflecting their 
underdeveloped stock markets.  
 
In short, there are important differences across country groups in the relative importance of 
different types of inflows, although there has been a broad shift away from debt financing 
towards FDI and equity flows in all groups. 
 
C.   Volatility of Inflows 
Table 3 looks at the volatility of different types of inflows, calculated as the cross-country 
averages of the standard deviations of different types of inflows (measured as ratios to GDP) 
over the period 1985–2004. The top panel shows that, in all country groups, gross inflows of 
debt financing are substantially more volatile than FDI or equity inflows, or the sum of FDI 
and equity inflows.  
 
However, the standard deviation is not a scale-free measure and could be affected by the 
magnitude of different types of flows. In the lower panel of Table 3, we examine a different 
measure of volatility—the coefficient of variation (the standard deviation divided by the 
mean). The results using this measure are less clear-cut. For emerging markets, FDI and the 
sum of FDI and equity are slightly less volatile than debt flows. Some of these results turn 
out to be sensitive to the choice of sample as a few countries have very small shares of 
certain types of flows, which distorts some of the results (by blowing up the coefficients of 
variation).  
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V.   MACROECONOMIC EVIDENCE ON EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION 
In this section, we review macroeconomic evidence on the effects of financial globalization 
in the three dimensions discussed in the theoretical overview—growth, volatility and 
comovement. The evidence based on cross-country regression frameworks has been 
inconclusive in some respects and, as we discuss below, has a number of conceptual 
limitations that can not easily be overcome just by using better cross-country datasets or 
more sophisticated econometric techniques. Nevertheless, this is a useful starting point as the 
aggregate evidence has been at the center of various debates on financial globalization. 
 
A.   Effects on Growth 
Perceptions about the growth benefits of financial integration owe much to the fact that 
emerging market economies have, as a group, experienced far higher cumulative growth 
since 1970 than other developing countries or even industrial countries, despite the crises that 
some in the former group have experienced (Figure 4). Excluding China and India from the 
list of emerging markets makes the cumulative growth performance of this group over this 
period look less spectacular, although it is still much better than that of the group of other 
developing countries.  
 
Figure 5A shows that there is no systematic relationship between the average level of 
de facto financial openness and growth during the period of globalization (defined here as 
1985–2004).
14 Controlling for standard growth determinants makes little difference (right 
panel). When one compares average GDP growth with the change in the financial openness 
measure from 1985 to 2004, however, there appears to be a weak positive association, 
consistent with the general wisdom that economies that integrated into global financial 
markets grew faster (Figure 5B). But once other growth determinants are controlled for, this 
relationship vanishes. There is of course considerable endogeneity embedded in regressions 
of this sort, but they do clarify the point taken from the literature based on cross-country 
growth regressions that financial integration by itself may not be the key to high growth.
15  
                                                 
14 We excluded from these plots a few countries that were outliers, mostly those with very high levels 
of financial openness relative to GDP (see the Data Appendix). Including all of the countries in our 
sample strengthened (or left essentially unchanged) all of the results reported here. We do not 
formally examine the effects of outliers as these plots are meant just to be descriptive and do not 
constitute formal empirical evidence. 
15 An alternative approach is to look at specific country experiences. Prasad, Rogoff, Wei, and Kose 
(2003) analyze the growth performance of the fastest and slowest-growing (or fastest-declining) 
economies during 1980–2000 and the status of their financial openness. They conclude that a high 
level of financial integration is not a necessary condition for attaining high growth. China and India 
achieved high growth rates despite limited and selective capital account liberalization. Mauritius and 
Botswana also had strong growth rates despite being relatively closed to financial flows. Financial 
integration is apparently also not a sufficient condition for attaining high growth. For example, Jordan 
and Peru became relatively open to foreign capital flows during this period; yet their economies 
contracted. Bakker and Chapple (2002) and Ariyoshi and others (2000) review the experiences of 
several industrial and developing countries, respectively, with the process of capital account 
liberalization.    - 18 -   
 
In Table 4A, we provide an overview of the literature that aims to establish a causal 
relationship between financial openness and growth. While some of these studies conclude 
that there are growth benefits associated with international financial integration, the majority 
of them tend to find no effect or a mixed effect (results that are not robust across alternative 
specifications) for developing countries. This confirms our earlier claim that, if financial 
integration has a positive effect on growth, it is apparently not robust, once the usual 
determinants of growth are controlled for. 
 
Growth effects of coarse versus finer de jure measures 
 
Why do different studies reach such diverse conclusions about the importance of financial 
integration in affecting long-run economic performance? A key issue that we noted earlier is 
related to the measurement of financial integration. Some widely used de jure measures are 
quite coarse and may not capture the true extent of international financial integration. As 
discussed by Edison, Klein, Ricci, and Sløk (2004), empirical studies using finer (more 
informative) de jure measures of capital account openness appear to reach more positive 
results about the impact of financial integration on economic growth than those that employ 
binary measures. For example, Rodrik (1998) finds that capital account liberalization has no 
significant effect on economic growth, but his analysis is based on a binary measure of 
capital controls. Employing a finer, and presumably more informative, version of the same 
openness measure, Quinn (1997) documents a positive association between capital account 
liberalization and economic growth.  
 
De facto versus de jure measures  
 
Among the studies that use both de jure and de facto measures, specifications where capital 
account openness is measured using de facto measures tend to lend more support for the 
potential growth enhancing effects of financial integration than those employing de jure 
measures (see Kraay, 1998; O’Donnell, 2001; and Edison, Levine, Ricci, and Sløk, 2002). 
The fact that studies using finer de jure measures and de facto measures find more evidence 
of positive growth effects suggests that appropriate measurement of financial integration is 
crucial for uncovering growth effects. It also suggests that the nature of financial 
integration—what types of inflows and outflows are permitted—may have an important 
bearing on the growth outcomes. We return to this later, but flag this as an area where more 
systematic research would be useful.    
 
Country coverage 
 
There are also materially important differences in the coverage of countries across studies. 
Some studies focus exclusively on advanced countries, a few consider developing and 
emerging market countries, and others use a combination of all three groups. Although Quinn 
(1997) finds that capital account liberalization tends to have a positive impact in all 
countries, Edwards (2001) and Edison, Klein, Ricci, and Sløk (2004) argue that its effect is 
very limited in less developed countries. Arteta, Eichengreen, and Wyplosz (2003), on the 
other hand, find no relationship between the level of development and the growth effects of 
capital account liberalization. We return to this issue in Section IX, when we discuss in more   - 19 -   
detail how the growth benefits of capital account liberalization may be influenced by specific 
country characteristics, many of which are of course related to the level of development. 
 
Time period 
 
The time period covered by different empirical analyses is another source of variation in 
results. Some studies use data going back to the early 1950s (Alesina, Grilli, and Milesi-
Ferretti, 1994), while others limit their examination to the post-1986 period (Klein and 
Olivei, 2006). Longer time spans are presumably more appropriate for studying the impact of 
international financial integration on economic growth. At the same time, one must keep in 
mind that capital flows to developing countries have really taken off only in the last two 
decades. The choice of sample period appears to make a big difference. For example, 
comparing the studies by Rodrik (1998) and Quinn (1997) which arrive at diametrically 
opposed conclusions, Eichengreen (2001) observes that Quinn’s sample coverage begins in 
1960 and Rodrik’s in 1975. Even though both studies use a sample ending in 1989, the 
impact of the debt crises of the 1980s receives a higher weight in Rodrik’s study since the 
span of his dataset is much shorter.  
 
Differences in methodologies 
 
Differences in empirical methodologies could also account for some of the variations in 
results across papers, especially given the large number of potential pitfalls in reduced-form 
cross-country regressions. While some studies point to the importance of capturing temporal 
effects associated with financial integration using dynamic regression models (McKenzie, 
2001), others emphasize the need to account for nonlinear interactions between financial 
integration and various factors affecting economic growth (Klein, 2005). Edison, Levine, 
Ricci, and Sløk (2002) employ a variety of statistical methodologies that allow them to deal 
with several econometric problems, including possible reverse causality—i.e., the possibility 
that any observed association between financial integration and growth could result from the 
mechanism that faster growing economies are more likely to liberalize their capital 
accounts.
16 After a battery of statistical analyses, they conclude that there is no robustly 
significant effect of financial integration on economic growth, although de facto measures of 
integration do tend to generate some results showing positive growth effects. 
 
Investment as an alternative dependent variable 
 
Another important difference across empirical studies is related to the choice of dependent 
variable. The studies we have summarized so far look at the relationship between financial 
integration and GDP growth. Is there evidence that financial integration boosts investment 
growth, as predicted by the neoclassical model? Bosworth and Collins (1999) and 
Borensztein, De Gregorio, and Lee (1998) find that there is a strong positive association 
between certain types of financial integration and investment growth. In particular, their 
                                                 
16 They use a generalized method of moments estimation procedure in which, under certain 
assumptions, lagged values of changes in the explanatory variables can be used as instruments to 
control for potential endogeneity of all of the explanatory variables.     - 20 -   
findings suggest that there exists an almost one-for-one relationship between FDI flows and 
domestic investment. The relationship between aggregate financial flows (as opposed to just 
FDI) and investment growth appears to be smaller and less robust. Mody and Murshid (2005) 
confirm the positive relationship reported in earlier results, but their results suggest that the 
impact of capital inflows on growth has been declining over time.  
 
Summary of evidence on growth benefits 
 
Our reading of this large literature based on aggregate data is that it remains difficult to find 
robust evidence that financial integration systematically increases growth, once other 
determinants of growth are controlled for. Nevertheless, the weight of the evidence seems to 
be gradually shifting towards finding positive marginal effects on growth, especially when 
financial integration is measured using de facto or finer de jure measures, when data over 
longer time periods are used, and when interaction terms accounting for supportive 
conditions (such as good policies and institutions) are properly included in cross-country 
regression frameworks. We will expand on these themes later in the paper.  
 
We should note, however, that potential endogeneity between financial integration and 
growth remains a problematic issue even in studies that do find a positive association 
between these variables. This problem may ultimately be intractable if one relies solely on 
macroeconomic data; looking at more disaggregated data may be one way out. Another 
possibility, as we will discuss later, is that it is very difficult, even at a conceptual level, to 
make strong causal statements about the consequences of financial globalization, 
independent of whether macro or micro data are used. 
 
B.   Effects on Volatility 
Capital account liberalization is believed to have played an important role in fomenting 
financial crises and has been indicted by some observers as the proximate cause for the crises 
experienced by various emerging markets over the last decades. Interestingly, there is little 
empirical evidence to support the view that capital account liberalization by itself increases 
vulnerability to crises. While crisis episodes receive most of the attention, however, they are 
just particularly sharp manifestations of the more general phenomenon of macroeconomic 
volatility. Here the results are less favorable—there is no evidence that financial 
globalization has delivered on the promised benefit of improved international risk sharing 
and reduced volatility of consumption. 
 
Crises 
 
Some papers that have analyzed the effects of capital controls on susceptibility to financial 
crises have found that countries with capital controls are in fact more subject to crises. But 
this could simply be because of a “selection effect”—often it is countries with poor 
macroeconomic fundamentals that put controls in place to try and insulate themselves from 
crises. Glick, Guo, and Hutchison (2006) address this issue—they find that capital account 
openness reduces the probability of currency crises, even after controlling for selection bias   - 21 -   
in terms of how macroeconomic policies influence the existence of capital controls.
17 The 
relationship between capital controls and crises could also reflect the fact that some of the 
countries are actually more integrated in terms of de facto measures of integration (capital 
flight) and that capital controls therefore do not insulate them from crises.  
 
Edwards (2005) examines this issue using a more sophisticated measure of de jure financial 
openness that attempts to incorporate some notion of the intensity of capital controls. He 
looks at two manifestations of external crises—sudden stops of capital inflows and current 
account reversals. He finds no systematic evidence that countries with higher capital mobility 
tend to have a higher incidence of crises, or tend to face a higher probability of having a 
crisis, than countries with lower mobility. In subsequent work, Edwards (2006) concludes 
that there is no evidence that the output costs of currency crises are smaller in countries that 
restrict capital mobility.  
 
While currency crises have been emphasized in the literature on the risks of capital account 
liberalization, it is worth noting that banking crises account for about one-third of financial 
crises over the last three decades and that their frequency increased in the 1980s and 1990s 
(Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). Banking crises tend to be more disruptive—Hutchison and 
Noy (2005), for instance, find that banking crises generally have larger adverse effects on 
output growth than currency crises. Glick and Hutchison (2001) explore the relationships 
between these two types of crises—one of their conclusions is that banking crises are a good 
indicator of future currency crises, while the reverse is not necessarily true. Furthermore, 
there appears to be little evidence that capital account liberalization by itself affects 
vulnerability to banking crises; moreover, the adverse effects of banking crises seem to be 
weaker for countries with open capital accounts (Bonfiglioli and Mendicino, 2004). 
 
In sum, there is little formal empirical evidence to support the oft-cited claims that financial 
globalization in and of itself is responsible for the spate of financial crises that the world has 
seen over the last three decades. Of course, as we will discuss in more detail below, the 
interaction between capital account liberalization and other policy choices (e.g., fixed 
exchange rate regimes that are not well supported by other macroeconomic policies) could, 
under certain circumstances, spell trouble for a developing economy.  
 
Volatility 
 
Turning to volatility more broadly, there has been a well-documented trend decline in 
macroeconomic volatility in most of the major industrial economies since the mid-1980s 
(Doyle and Faust, 2005), although the reasons for this decline are still a matter of debate. 
Output volatility seems to have been on a declining trend in emerging market and developing 
economies as well. However, the existing evidence based on papers using a variety of 
regression models, different country samples and time periods leads to the conclusion that 
                                                 
17 These authors use a binary capital account openness indicator based on the IMF’s AREAER. 
Whether this relationship holds up with de facto measures, which we have argued are more 
appropriate measures of integration, remains to be seen.    - 22 -   
there is no systematic empirical relationship between financial openness and output volatility, 
which is, in a sense, consistent with the predictions of theory.
18  
 
Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2003b) confirm the major trends in the evolution of volatility 
dynamics reported in earlier studies, but also find that, during the 1990s, average declines in 
output growth volatility were smaller for emerging markets than for either industrial or low-
income developing economies. More importantly, they find that the ratio of consumption 
growth volatility to income growth volatility increased during the recent period of 
globalization for emerging market economies (and remained flat for the other two groups). 
What is surprising is not just that the volatility of consumption rose (perhaps because of 
crises experienced by some of these economies, and the associated rise in income volatility) 
but that it increased by more than income volatility. This is a striking result in that it runs 
exactly counter to one of the presumed theoretical benefits of financial integration—that it 
allows countries to share income risk and smooth consumption.
19  
 
These authors also find that the relative volatility of consumption growth increases with the 
degree of financial openness, but only up to a certain threshold level of integration. At higher 
levels of financial integration, countries do seem to accrue the benefits of financial 
integration in terms of improved risk sharing and better consumption smoothing relative to 
autarky. Most emerging market economies are, however, below this threshold level of 
financial integration while most industrial economies are above it.
20  
 
C.   Comovement 
A number of papers show that the synchronicity of national business cycle fluctuations (in 
both industrial countries and emerging market economies) and the relative importance of 
global factors for these fluctuations have increased during the period of globalization.
21 Imbs 
(2006) documents that financial integration has led to higher cross-country consumption and 
                                                 
18 See Razin and Rose (1994); Easterly, Islam, and Stiglitz (2001); and Buch, Dopke, and Pierdzioch 
(2005).  
19 A number of recent theoretical papers have attempted to explain the positive association between 
financial integration and the relative volatility of consumption growth documented by Kose, Prasad, 
and Terrones (2003b). For instance, Levchenko (2004) and Leblebicioglu (2006) consider dynamic 
general equilibrium models where only some agents have access to international financial markets. In 
both models, capital account liberalization leads to an increase in the volatility of aggregate 
consumption since agents with access to international financial markets stop participating in risk-
sharing arrangements with those who do not have such access. 
20 Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2006) find that, following equity market liberalizations, there is a 
decline in consumption volatility. These results differ from those of Kose, Prasad, and Terrones 
(2003b) due to differences in the definitions of financial integration, the measures of consumption 
volatility, data samples, and methodologies. The results in Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2006) 
suffer from the same problems noted about their work on the impact of equity market liberalizations 
on economic growth (see discussion in Section VI). 
21 See Stock and Watson (2003); Bordo and Helbling (2003); Kose, Otrok, and Whiteman (2005); and 
Kose, Otrok, and Prasad (2006).   - 23 -   
output correlations among industrialized economies. Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2003a) 
document changes in output comovement across a broader group of industrial and developing 
economies and link these changes to financial integration. Contrary to the predictions of 
theory, however, Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2003a, 2004) document that, on average, 
cross-country correlations of consumption growth did not increase in the 1990s, precisely 
when financial integration would have been expected to result in better risk-sharing 
opportunities for developing economies.  
These findings on the cross-country comovement of output and consumption complement the 
results on the effects of financial integration on consumption and output volatility and 
suggest that, in order to utilize the risk-sharing benefits of financial integration, developing 
economies may have to attain higher levels of financial integration.  
To summarize, the macroeconomic evidence on the growth and volatility effects of financial 
integration remains sobering although there are some grounds for optimism in more recent 
work. But most of the evidence so far is based on cross-country regressions that lump 
together different types of capital flows. Is there a different way to approach the issue? 
 
VI.   HOW DOES THE COMPOSITION OF CAPITAL FLOWS MATTER? 
An alternative line of inquiry into the effects of financial globalization is based on the notion 
that not all types of capital flows are created equal. Flows that have equity-like features—i.e., 
FDI and portfolio equity flows—are not only presumed to be more stable and less prone to 
reversals (Wei, 2005), but are also believed to bring with them many of the indirect benefits 
of financial globalization such as transfers of managerial and technological expertise. As we 
discussed in Section IV, the evidence for the former proposition—that FDI and equity flows 
are more stable than debt financing—is far from conclusive.  
 
In any case, portfolio debt flows have acquired black-sheep status, especially since currency 
and maturity mismatches related to external debt are seen as proximate determinants of many 
emerging market crises. As we have documented earlier, there have been substantial changes 
in the composition of financial flows over time. So what does the evidence show about the 
macroeconomic effects of different types of flows? We now review the literature on this 
question, studying the impact of each of these types of flows in turn.  
 
A.   Portfolio Equity Flows 
The rising importance of portfolio equity flows to emerging markets has motivated a number 
of researchers to examine the growth effects of equity market liberalizations. Most of the 
papers in this rapidly expanding literature suggest that portfolio equity flows have a 
significant positive impact on output growth. Whether the estimated growth effects (in 
macroeconomic data) of equity market liberalizations could be picking up the effects of other 
factors—especially other reforms that tend to accompany these liberalizations—remains, in 
our view, an open question. On the other hand, there is now a growing body of micro 
evidence (using industry- and firm-level data) supporting the macro evidence on the benefits 
of equity liberalizations. Some of these papers also document the empirical relevance of 
various theoretical channels linking equity market liberalization to economic growth—  - 24 -   
including through increases in investment growth and total factor productivity (TFP) growth. 
Table 4B provides a summary of the key papers discussed in this section. 
 
Evidence from macro data 
 
Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005; hereinafter referred to as BHL) document that equity 
market liberalizations have a positive effect on growth.
22 Using a sample that covers 95 
countries over the period 1980–97, they conclude that equity market liberalizations increase 
GDP growth by about 1 percentage point. Using a longer sample and a different 
methodology, Li (2003) finds that such liberalizations lead to a 0.6 percentage point increase 
in GDP growth. 
 
A potential concern related to this work based on cross-country regressions is that many 
emerging markets undertook equity market liberalizations around the same time that they 
instituted numerous other policy and structural reforms. Henry (2003a, 2003b) argues that it 
is not possible to explain the strong result in BHL using standard growth accounting 
techniques as this would require an elasticity of output with respect to capital of about 1. He 
notes that equity market liberalizations are often part of a larger reform program and that 
these reforms could have a positive impact on productivity, leading to an increase in output 
growth that is compatible with the predictions of standard production theory. 
 
To address these concerns, BHL control for other determinants of growth, including financial 
development, quality of legal institutions, macroeconomic policies, and broader capital 
account and trade liberalizations. They find that capital account liberalization has no 
significant effect on growth. The inclusion of other factors dampens the magnitude of the 
growth effects of equity market liberalizations but the effect is still statistically significant 
and in the range of 0.7–0.9 percentage points.
23 Henry (2003a), however, finds these 
sensitivity experiments unconvincing since BHL do not use binary variables to capture the 
effect of many other one-off reforms, especially trade reforms and inflation stabilizations (for 
instance, they use a continuous measure of trade openness). Henry argues that, since BHL 
undertake a before-and-after evaluation of the growth effects of equity market liberalizations, 
they should conduct the same before-and-after event analysis for other reforms as well.   
 
                                                 
22 Equity market liberalizations are defined as events that make shares of common stock of local firms 
available to foreign investors. Commonly-used dates, drawn from Henry (2000) and Bekaert and 
Harvey (2000), include official liberalization dates and dates of “first sign” of liberalization based on 
events such as the launching of a country fund or American Depository Receipt (ADR) 
announcement. ADRs are securities that are traded in the United States but represent underlying 
stocks listed in a foreign country. 
23 BHL also attempt to tackle potential endogeneity between the liberalization decision and growth 
performance—an issue emphasized by Martell and Stulz (2003). They create a proxy for a country’s 
exogenous growth opportunities, based on a country’s industry mix and global growth prospects for 
each industry (inferred from the price to earnings ratios of global industry portfolios). They find that 
inclusion of this variable in the regressions, which they argue is an indirect way of controlling for the 
endogeneity of the liberalization decision, does not affect their main result.   - 25 -   
Other macroeconomic evidence on the growth effects of equity market liberalizations is more 
mixed. Martell and Stulz (2003) note that equity market liberalizations can be seen as 
country initial public offerings (IPOs) since, like company IPOs, these events make shares in 
existing firms available to a new class of investors—foreign investors. These authors 
examine country excess returns, defined as excess returns on a dollar-denominated total 
return index for each country, relative to excess returns of a global portfolio and an emerging 
markets index. They report that, following equity market liberalizations, country excess 
returns are high for the first 2–4 years but then turn marginally negative over longer horizons. 
Edison, Klein, Ricci, and Slok (2004) confirm the positive association between equity market 
liberalization and output growth but find that this result disappears when they introduce a 
measure of government reputation as a regressor. When they interact the liberalization 
measure with income, they recover its positive impact on growth in middle income countries.  
 
Recent research also provides some cross-country evidence about the empirical relevance of 
various channels linking equity market liberalization to economic growth. There is evidence, 
consistent with the predictions of international asset pricing models, that stock market 
liberalizations reduce the cost of capital.
24 Using a sample of 12 emerging market countries 
and an event study approach, Henry (2000a) shows that, on average, equity price indexes 
register a substantial increase in the months preceding equity market liberalizations, implying 
that these liberalizations are associated with a fall in the cost of equity capital. Bekaert and 
Harvey (2000) analyze changes in the dividend yield after liberalizations and report that the 
cost of capital goes down by 5 to 75 basis points.  
 
There is also some evidence that equity market liberalizations promote investment growth. 
Henry (2000b), for instance, finds that, in 9 (10) out of 11 emerging market countries in his 
sample, growth rates of private investment are larger in the first (second) year after an equity 
market liberalization than they were before liberalization. Moreover, he finds that the mean 
growth rate of real private investment in the three years immediately following equity market 
liberalizations is 22 percentage points higher than the sample mean. Alfaro and Hammel 
(2006) find that equity market liberalizations boost imports of machinery going into domestic 
equipment investment. 
 
Evidence from micro data 
 
We view research using industry- and firm-level data as a more promising way of getting a 
handle on the growth-enhancing effects of equity market liberalizations. This line of 
empirical research has turned up encouraging results. For example, using industry-level panel 
data from the manufacturing sectors of 31 emerging market economies over the period 1981–
98, Gupta and Yuan (2005) find that, following such liberalizations, industries that are 
technologically more dependent on external finance (the difference between investments and 
                                                 
24 First, such a liberalization could increase the volume of capital inflows, which, in turn, should 
decrease the domestic risk-free rate. Second, increased risk sharing opportunities between foreign and 
domestic investors might help to diversify risks, reducing the equity risk premium. Third, as capital 
flows increase and liquidity in the domestic stock market increases, the equity risk premium could fall 
further. See Stulz (1999a, 1999b) and Kim and Singal (2000) for additional empirical evidence.   - 26 -   
cash generated from operations) experience higher growth. They also find that liberalizations 
have a larger impact on the growth of industries facing better growth opportunities (based on 
industry-level global demand indicators). When the liberalization decision is assumed to be 
endogenous, however, only the former result survives, suggesting that countries may time the 
liberalization decision to coincide with high growth in certain industries.  
 
Hammel (2006) provides additional evidence that, following equity market liberalizations, 
industries that are more dependent on external finance grow faster in countries with relatively 
higher stock market capitalization rates. She also examines the impact of other reforms, 
including domestic financial reforms and capital account liberalization, on the robustness of 
her main findings. She concludes that, while such reforms do have significantly positive 
effects on industry growth, their interaction terms with dependence on external finance are 
not significant, and they do not affect the growth impact of equity market liberalizations.
25  
 
Using firm-level data, Chari and Henry (2004, 2005) find that equity market liberalizations 
reduce the cost of equity capital and increase investment in a sample of 11 emerging market 
countries. They find that these events reduce the systematic risk associated with holding 
stocks in emerging markets and leads to an average stock price increase of about 15 percent. 
The latter paper documents that the growth rate of the capital stock of a typical firm exceeds 
its pre-liberalization mean by an average of 5.4 percentage points in the three-year period 
following liberalization.  
 
Mitton (2006) argues that equity market liberalization gives firms in emerging markets 
access to a new financing channel, increasing opportunities for investment and growth. 
Moreover, foreign investors tend to demand higher governance standards, which could have 
a positive impact on profitability, efficiency, and other measures of operating performance. 
In his empirical work, Mitton finds that firms with stocks that are open to foreign investors 
register higher levels of sales growth, investment, and efficiency, and lower leverage ratios.
26 
Summary, and a caveat 
 
Our view is that research on the effects of equity market liberalizations is quite promising, 
although even in this area disaggregated evidence may have a better chance of pinning down 
the channels through which such liberalizations generate positive effects. In addition to the 
problem that much of this literature is still focused on macroeconomic evidence, virtually all 
of it is based on de jure measures of equity market liberalization. We have already noted, in 
                                                 
25 Gupta and Yuan (2005) and Hammel (2006) use the Rajan and Zingales (1998) criterion to 
determine the level of dependence of different industries on external finance. 
26 Mitton employs firm-specific liberalization dates on which individual stocks become open to 
foreign investors. These dates are based on data from the International Finance Corporation, which 
specifies the extent of openness of each stock to foreign investors and determines dates on which a 
firm’s stock can gain “investable” status, after analyzing country- and firm-level investment barriers. 
The use of firm-specific liberalization dates allows Mitton to account for the gradual nature of 
liberalization programs. It also mitigates potential contamination of the results by other liberalization 
and reform programs, although the firm-specific dates may still create endogeneity problems.   - 27 -   
the context of the measurement of broader capital account liberalization, why de facto 
measures may be more meaningful in many circumstances.   
 
Why is it that, using similar de jure measures, the growth effects of broader capital account 
liberalization are found to be quite weak while those of equity market liberalization are 
remarkably and uniformly strongly positive? As noted above, one possibility is that equity 
market reforms may take place only when governments feel they have supportive conditions 
in place. Analyses based on micro data indicate that the productivity-enhancing effects of 
equity market liberalizations are greater than those of broader capital account liberalizations. 
Nevertheless, while the evidence does suggest that equity market liberalizations may have an 
independent impact on growth, we are skeptical that these liberalizations by themselves can 
generate as large growth effects as has been reported by some authors such as BHL. 
 
B.   Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
We turn next to the presumed poster child for the benefits of financial globalization—FDI. 
As we discussed earlier, the relative importance of FDI flows has risen significantly in recent 
years, making it the most important form of private international financing for emerging 
market economies. There is a strong presumption in theory that FDI should yield more 
benefits than other types of financial flows since, in addition to augmenting domestic capital 
stock, it has a positive impact on productivity through transfers of technology and managerial 
expertise. It has also been argued that FDI tends to be the least volatile of the various types of 
capital flows, making countries less vulnerable to sudden stops or reversals of flows.
27  
 
In parallel with the rapid growth of FDI flows, a large empirical literature has flourished 
seeking to find evidence in support of the theoretical benefits of these flows. Although the 
evidence has in general been mixed, recent studies, using more sophisticated methodologies 
and micro-level datasets, find more favorable evidence of benefits from FDI. More 
importantly, the literature has been reasonably successful in identifying the conditions 
necessary to help developing countries fully utilize the potential benefits of these flows.
28 
Table 4C provides a summary of the key studies in this literature.  
 
FDI and growth: Evidence from macro data 
 
Studies using aggregate data have been unable to provide conclusive evidence about the 
positive impact of FDI on economic growth. While some papers show that FDI enhances 
GDP growth, others report that there is no direct evidence of such a relationship.
29 How can 
we reconcile these disparate findings? 
                                                 
27 Moreover, FDI could help ease firms’ financing constraints. Harrison, Love, and McMillan (2004) 
document that FDI is associated with a significant reduction in financing constraints, especially in 
low income countries. Blalock and Gertler (2005) find that FDI could mitigate the adverse effects of 
financial crises by helping firms maintain continuous access to credit through their parent companies. 
28 Recent surveys of this literature include Lipsey (2004) and Moran, Graham, and Blomstrom (2005). 
29 On the former, see Haveman, Lei, and Netz (2001). On the latter, see Carkovic and Levine (2005).   - 28 -   
 
Blonigen and Wang (2005) show that inappropriate pooling of data from developed and 
developing countries could dampen the estimated growth effects of FDI. Since FDI is more 
likely to crowd in domestic investment in developing countries than in developed ones, it 
could have larger effects on growth in the former group. Some empirical studies note that 
FDI seems to boost growth only in economies that have the right initial conditions, including 
high levels of human capital, financial sector development and policies fostering free trade.
30  
 
The growth benefits of FDI also depend on its sectoral composition and its interactions with 
domestic investment (see Aykut and Sayek, 2005). FDI flows into the primary sector may 
have limited beneficial spillovers, since they often involve mega projects that scarcely 
employ domestically-produced intermediate goods. FDI in the manufacturing sector, on the 
other hand, tends to have a significant effect on GDP growth because of stronger linkages 
between this sector and the rest of the economy.  
 
Carkovic and Levine (2005) provide a comprehensive analysis of the growth effects of FDI. 
Using panel GMM estimators and a dataset covering the period 1960–1997, they conclude 
that, after controlling for the joint determination of FDI and growth, FDI has no robust causal 
effect on economic growth. Melitz (2005) points out that the baseline results of Carkovic and 
Levine in fact suggest a positive association between FDI and economic growth, but this 
positive link disappears when they introduce controls for trade and domestic financial credit. 
Melitz notes that there are strong linkages between FDI and trade flows; more importantly, 
joint changes in FDI and trade flows are correlated with economic growth. He concludes that 
Carkovic and Levine’s results imply that an expansion of FDI flows accompanied by an 
increase in trade could indeed enhance growth. 
  
FDI and productivity: Evidence from micro data 
 
FDI can in principle generate productivity spillovers through several channels, including 
imitation (adoption of new production methods), skill acquisition (education/training of 
workers), competition (efficient use of existing resources by domestic firms), and exports 
(expansion of export potential of domestic firms).  
 
The evidence on the role of horizontal spillovers—productivity spillovers from foreign firms 
to domestic firms in the same sector—in transmitting the productivity benefits of FDI has 
been inconclusive.
31 Lipsey and Sjolhom (2005) conclude that the differences in results 
                                                 
30 The importance of these three initial conditions is shown by Borensztein, De Gregorio, and Lee 
(1998); Hermes and Lensink (2003) and Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Sayek (2006); and 
Balasubramanyan, Salisu, and Sapsford (1996), respectively. The growth effects of FDI also depend 
on the complementarity/substitutability between FDI and domestic investment (De Mello, 1999).  
31 Papers by Haddad and Harrison (1993) on Morocco; Aitken and Harrison (1999) on Venezuela; 
Djankov and Hoekman (2000) on the Czech Republic find that the net effect of FDI on sectoral 
productivity appears to be small. However, other studies by Haskel, Pereira, and Slaughter (2002) on 
the United Kingdom; Keller and Yeaple (2003) on the United States; and Blalock and Gertler (2005) 
on Indonesia document significant horizontal spillovers from FDI to sectoral productivity.   - 29 -   
across such studies are related to various country characteristics, including level of human 
capital, degree of competition in the sector, ability of the sector to adopt new technologies, 
institutional factors, and trade and investment policies. Lipsey (2004) emphasizes the 
importance of the trade regime. He notes that Morocco and Venezuela were relatively closed 
to trade during the periods covered by the panel datasets used in the widely-cited studies by 
Haddad and Harrison (1993) and Aitken and Harrison (1999), respectively.
32  
 
The research program on horizontal spillovers has, however, stalled for a number of reasons. 
Gorg and Greenaway (2004) note that studies employing cross-section data can not truly 
establish causality since they are unable to account for differences in productivity across 
sectors. If foreign firms tend to locate in high-productivity sectors, these studies might 
conclude that there is a positive association between FDI and productivity even if there are 
no productivity spillovers. More importantly, studies looking for horizontal spillovers do not 
account for the possibility that foreign firms may try to minimize technological spillovers to 
domestic firms in the same sector in order to protect their firm-specific advantages.  
 
However, foreign firms might have incentives to transfer knowledge to their local suppliers 
and customers, implying that productivity spillovers from FDI may occur through “vertical” 
rather than horizontal linkages. This is a promising line of research that has picked up steam 
in recent years. For instance, Javorcik (2004) uses enterprise-level data from Lithuania and 
employs semiparametric estimation methods to account for simultaneity and sample selection 
problems affecting ordinary-least squares (OLS) estimates. Her results suggest that, although 
there are positive spillovers from FDI occurring through backward linkages, there are few 
spillovers through horizontal channels. She reports that the magnitude of the spillover effect 
is economically meaningful—a 10 percent increase in foreign presence in downstream 
sectors is associated with a 0.38 percent increase in the output of firms in the supplying 
industry.
33  
 
Summary of evidence on benefits of FDI 
 
Despite the theoretical presumption that, of the different types of inflows, FDI has the 
strongest benefits, it has not proven easy to document these benefits. Recent empirical 
research that takes a more nuanced approach, especially by accounting for the role of various 
initial conditions (human capital, trade openness), has been more successful at showing the 
potential links between FDI and growth. Similarly, at the micro level, a reassessment of the 
channels through which technological spillovers from FDI inflows should take place has 
begun to turn up more positive evidence of such spillovers.  
                                                 
32 Based on those two studies, Rodrik (1999) argues that FDI has no extra benefit to host country 
development. Moran (2005) dismisses this argument, noting that both of these countries practiced 
import-substitution based trade policies during the periods analyzed in these papers. He provides 
several case studies showing that the full benefits of FDI are realized only in an environment with 
minimal distortions from trade barriers and other protectionist policies. 
33 Other studies showing positive FDI spillovers through backward linkages include Lopez-Cordova 
(2003) on Mexico; Alfaro and Rodriguez-Clare (2004) on Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela; and Blalock 
and Gertler (2005) on Indonesia.   - 30 -   
 
C.   Debt Flows 
There is a general consensus in the literature on financial globalization that debt flows, which 
include portfolio bond flows and commercial bank loans, generate the greatest risks from 
financial openness. Even at a conceptual level, it is easy to see why debt flows do not have 
the positive attributes of equity-like flows. They do not solve certain agency problems, can 
lead to inefficient capital allocation if domestic banks are poorly supervised, and generate 
moral hazard as debt is implicitly guaranteed by the government (in the case of corporate 
debt) and/or international financial institutions (both corporate and sovereign debt). 
 
Volatility of debt flows 
 
Debt flows appear to be more volatile than other types of inflows and easily reversible in 
times of crises. Wei (2006) argues that sudden reversals of international capital flows are 
more likely to occur among countries that rely relatively more on portfolio debt flows, 
including bank loans, and less on FDI. Moreover, short-term bank loans to developing 
countries are procyclical, i.e., they tend to increase during booms and rapidly decrease during 
economic slowdowns (World Bank, 2000). The procyclical and highly volatile nature of 
these flows can magnify the adverse impact of negative shocks on economic growth. 
 
Furthermore, opening up to debt flows can give profligate governments and weakly 
supervised financial sectors a lot more room to increase their vulnerability to shocks. For 
instance, McKinnon and Pill (1996) describe the problem of overborrowing by banks in the 
event of financial liberalization without adequate supervision. They show in a theoretical 
model that moral hazard in domestic financial markets and unrestricted capital flows can 
together create a potential for disaster. McKinnon and Pill (1998) extend the model to show 
that open capital accounts can exacerbate the adverse effects of poor financial sector 
supervision by allowing banks to expose their balance sheets to currency risk and also by 
permitting them to take speculative open positions in foreign exchange. 
 
Interestingly, countries with unfavorable conditions tend to rely more on short-term external 
debt denominated in foreign currencies as their main source of foreign capital.
34 This creates 
vulnerabilities, especially when the domestic financial system through which this capital is 
intermediated is underdeveloped, poorly supervised, and subject to governance problems.  
 
Risks of short-term debt 
 
There appears to be a systematic empirical link between exposure to short-term debt and the 
likelihood of financial crises. For example, the literature on early warning systems generates 
a clear result that high levels of short-term external debt denominated in foreign currencies 
substantially increase vulnerability to financial crises (see Berg, Borenzstein, and Pattillo, 
2004 for a review of this literature). This finding is not unexpected, since currency and 
                                                 
34 Eichengreen, Hausmann, and Panizza (2006) argue that this is the only form of international capital 
inflows available to certain countries, so they may have little say in this outcome.   - 31 -   
maturity mismatches of debt structures have been shown to frequently tip countries over into 
crises. Rodrik and Velasco (2000) find that the ratio of short-term debt to reserves is a robust 
predictor of financial crises among emerging market economies. They report that countries 
with a larger short-term debt stock than reserves are three times more likely to experience a 
sudden and massive reversal in financial flows. Their results also indicate that the severity of 
crises becomes more acute as the exposure to short-term debt increases.  
 
However, even if debt flows—especially of short maturity—are more likely to be associated 
with less desirable outcomes, one cannot automatically infer that a ban on debt flows would 
be beneficial in all cases. Diamond and Rajan (2001) posit that banks in developing countries 
have little choice but to generate liquidity through short-term debt in order to finance illiquid 
projects in a low-quality investment environment. The implication is that the greater 
vulnerability of developing countries to financial crises is not the result of their large stock of 
short-term debt, but a byproduct of the illiquidity and low creditworthiness of the investment 
opportunities in these countries. A capital-poor country that has no access to equity or FDI 
inflows might still be able to benefit from debt inflows to finance illiquid investments, even 
though it could potentially face more risks. Similarly, Jeanne (2003) argues that short-term 
debt could serve as a useful commitment device to foster good macroeconomic policies, 
although debt would of course increase vulnerability to external shocks. 
 
D.   Synthesis 
The literature that we have summarized thus far suggests that, in the macroeconomic data, it 
is difficult to find robust causal evidence that financial integration boosts growth. But there is 
apparently strong indication that equity market liberalizations boost growth. The evidence 
that FDI increases growth is less conclusive, although more recent work has begun to come 
up with more positive evidence. There are two related strands of literature that help round out 
the picture. The first looks jointly at the effects of different flows in a common framework. 
The second analyzes the costs of capital controls—this constitutes another approach to 
examining the costs/benefits of financial integration.  
 
Joint analyses of effects of different types of flows  
 
A number of authors have attempted to disentangle the effects of different types of flows by 
looking at them in a unified empirical framework. The results are largely consistent with 
those from papers looking at each of these types of flows individually. For instance, Reisen 
and Soto (2001) conclude that FDI and portfolio equity flows increase growth while portfolio 
bond flows and official flows do not. They also find that foreign bank lending—both short-
term and long-term—is negatively associated with growth, except in countries where local 
banks are well capitalized. By contrast, Durham (2004) finds that both FDI and total portfolio 
flows (bond and equity) could have growth-enhancing effects, depending on the level of a 
country’s financial and institutional development. Portfolio flows have a larger growth 
impact in countries that have higher stock market capitalization or are more open to trade.  
 
A different theme that emerges from the evidence we have reviewed thus far is that many of 
the benefits of financial openness seem to be masked in cross-country analysis using 
macroeconomic data but are more apparent in disaggregated analyses using micro data. The   - 32 -   
latter approach has the advantage of being able to provide more detailed analyses of how 
capital account opening affects the allocation of capital and overall efficiency. However, 
even using micro data it is difficult to separate out the effects of capital account liberalization 
from those of other reforms. In addition, micro data are usually available only for a limited 
set of countries. Nevertheless, this literature has the potential of enabling a closer look at how 
capital account liberalization affects life in the corporate trenches—how firms are affected 
and what some of the distributional consequences might be.  
 
Costs of capital controls 
 
One strand of the literature using micro data has focused on estimating the costs of capital 
controls, an enterprise that is very complicated in aggregate data owing to endogeneity, 
timing and other problems.
35 Forbes (2005a) provides a comprehensive survey of this 
literature and concludes that capital controls can cause distortions in the behavior of firms 
(and individuals) as they adjust their behavior to evade capital controls. By insulating an 
economy from competitive forces, they may also reduce market discipline.
36 In addition, the 
administration of capital controls imposes a cost on the government, especially since the 
controls often have to be continually updated in order to close loopholes and limit evasion.  
 
Forbes (2005b) argues further that capital controls may reduce vulnerability to crises but 
have large costs in terms of not just efficiency losses and less market discipline but also 
reduced capital flows. She acknowledges that these effects are difficult to detect at the 
macroeconomic level but notes that the costs are apparent in microeconomic data. Desai, 
Foley, and Hines (2004) use firm-level data to argue that the cost of capital is higher for 
multinationals when capital controls are in place.
 37 The wedge arises because capital controls 
typically result in costs of avoidance of those controls as well as higher domestic interest 
rates. Multinational affiliates located in countries with capital controls are found to face 
interest rates that are about 5 percentage points higher than affiliates of the same parent 
company borrowing locally in countries without capital controls. These authors also 
conclude, based on the cross-country investment patterns of multinationals, that the level of 
FDI inflows into a country is adversely affected by capital controls. 
 
In short, the existence of capital controls appears to result in significant efficiency costs at the 
level of individual firms or sectors. We find this evidence plausible although, as before, the 
fact that this strand of the literature largely uses de jure measures of integration gives one 
                                                 
35 Magud and Reinhart (2006) argue that the literature analyzing the macroeconomic implications of 
capital controls using aggregate data has only limited value added since the studies in this literature 
suffer from various problems, including the use of heterogeneous samples, differences in 
methodologies, and multiple definitions of outcomes associated with the success of controls.  
36 For instance, Johnson and Mitton (2002) argue that capital controls reduced market discipline 
among Malaysian firms and created a screen for cronyism. 
37 These authors use the IMF 0-1 capital account openness indicator and also a measure of openness 
to FDI that reflects restrictions on capital repatriation and remittances of profits.    - 33 -   
pause. A mitigating circumstance is that some of the papers noted above (including many in 
the survey by Forbes, 2005a) are based on data from individual countries or small groups  
of countries where one has good reason to believe that the capital controls really had a bite, 
although this might generate subtle sample selection problems.  
 
VII.   ORGANIZING PRINCIPLES 
To put together the disparate strands of evidence that we have assembled thus far, we now 
introduce a framework that may help reconcile some of the apparently inconsistent results in 
the literature and also shed some light on why empirical evidence at different levels of 
disaggregation may reach different conclusions.  
 
A.   Collateral Benefits 
A key component of our argument is that it is not just the capital inflows themselves, but 
what comes along with the capital inflows, that drives the benefits of financial globalization 
for developing countries. (See Box 1.) There is considerable evidence, as we discuss later on, 
that financial integration serves as an important catalyst for a number of indirect benefits, 
which we term potential “collateral benefits” since they may not generally be the primary 
motivations for countries to undertake financial integration. These collateral benefits could 
include development of the domestic financial sector, improvements in institutions (defined 
broadly to include governance, the rule of law, etc.), better macroeconomic policies, etc. 
These collateral benefits then result in higher growth, usually through gains in allocative 
efficiency.  
 
The empirical implications of this perspective are powerful. First of all, it suggests that the 
beneficial impact of financial integration on growth may take a while to show up because it 
operates through these indirect channels rather than just directly through financing of 
domestic investment.
38 More importantly, it suggests that, in a regression framework, it may 
be difficult to disentangle the effects of financial integration if one includes measures of 
institutional quality, financial sector development, quality of macroeconomic policies etc. 
After all, it is these very channels through which financial integration generates growth 
benefits. This problem cannot be resolved simply by using a technique such as instrumental 
variables estimation; that would entirely miss the logic of the scheme above since our interest 
is in how financial integration affects growth through all channels, direct and indirect. 
 
 
 
                                                 
38 A number of papers have explicitly taken the tack that the costs of financial globalization—
including crises—are in the nature of growing pains that will recede once globalizing economies 
achieve fuller integration. Krugman (2002) contends that “In the long run, integration may solve the 
problems it initially creates.” Martinez, Tornell, and Westermann (2004) argue that crises are the 
price that must be paid to attain rapid growth in the presence of contract enforceability problems. 
These authors present some evidence that developing economies that have registered higher growth 
rates have typically experienced boom-bust cycles (also see Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2003, and 
Bussiere and Fratzscher, 2004).   - 34 -   
  Box 1. Two Views of Impact of Financial Globalization on Developing Countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One can not, of course, overstate the case that financial integration leads to the collateral 
benefits. It is equally plausible, for instance, that, all else being equal, more foreign capital 
tends to flow to countries with better-developed financial markets and institutions. As the 
literature that we discuss later in the paper shows, however, there is a fair amount of evidence 
to support the proposition that financial integration serves as a catalyst for many collateral 
benefits. We also do not dismiss the importance of traditional channels—that financial 
integration may increase investment by relaxing the constraints imposed by low levels of 
domestic saving and by reducing the cost of capital. But our view is that the importance of 
this direct channel by which financial integration influences growth may have been 
overemphasized in previous literature.  
 
B.   Thresholds 
A large related literature has attempted to tackle the question of what initial conditions help 
prepare the ground for financial openness to generate good growth benefits for a country and 
lower the risks. There is plenty of evidence that premature opening of the capital account 
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without having in place well-developed and well-supervised financial sectors, good 
institutions, and sound macroeconomic policies can hurt a country by making the structure of 
inflows unfavorable and by making the country vulnerable to sudden stops or reversals of 
flows. Furthermore, the process of globalization seems to proceed more smoothly when trade 
liberalization precedes financial integration. Thus, it is the interaction between financial 
globalization and this set of initial conditions that determines growth and volatility outcomes. 
 
 
  Box 2. But There Are Thresholds 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comparing Box 2 to that of the previous one on collateral benefits highlights a deep tension 
between the costs and benefits of financial globalization. Note that most (but not all) of the 
elements on the list of threshold conditions are identical to the list of collateral benefits. In 
other words, financial globalization serves as a catalyst for a number of important collateral 
benefits but can greatly elevate the risks to benefits ratio if the initial conditions in these 
dimensions are inadequate.  
 
Unfortunately, as we discuss in detail later in the paper, existing papers have identified only 
the importance of threshold effects in specific dimensions. There is as yet little work on the 
relative importance of different thresholds and the trade-offs among different threshold 
conditions. What would be most useful for a country contemplating liberalization of its 
capital account would be a composite threshold measure that would determine its 
preparedness to undertake this policy change. In the absence of such a measure, it is hard to 
determine when a country is ready for financial integration.  
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Does this imply that there is simply no alternative for a country desirous of benefiting from 
the collateral benefits of financial globalization but to expose itself to substantial risks of 
crises? Or to remain closed and stay on what might be a much lower growth path? Our view 
is that, while the risks can never be totally avoided, there are ways to improve the benefit-risk 
calculus of financial globalization. There is, however, unlikely to be a uniform approach to 
opening the capital account that will work well for all countries. Indeed, the collateral 
benefits perspective may provide a way for moving forward on capital account liberalization 
that takes into account individual country circumstances (initial conditions) as well as the 
relative priorities of different collateral benefits for that country.  
 
C.   A Corollary: Collateral Benefits Enhance Productivity Growth 
The collateral benefits that we have identified above should enhance efficiency and, by 
extension, TFP growth. Thus, our approach ties in nicely with the recent literature 
emphasizing the importance of TFP growth as the main driver of long-term growth.
39 But 
there is as yet little empirical work looking at whether financial integration boosts TFP 
growth. 
 
This has important implications for analyzing how international capital mobility can affect 
growth. The classical notion that capital mobility allows capital-poor countries to grow faster 
through higher investment has been challenged, for instance, by Gourinchas and Jeanne 
(2006), who argue that the welfare gains from capital mobility are likely to be small. Their 
key proposition is that capital controls constitute a transitory distortion since even a 
financially closed economy eventually accumulates capital domestically, so the distortion 
vanishes over time. Hence, viewing the benefits of capital account liberalization as those 
resulting from a permanent reduction in this distortion (as captured, for instance, by the 
wedge between domestic and international interest rates) is an overstatement of the benefits. 
These authors conclude (as do Hall and Jones, 1999) that developing countries have lower 
per capita income because they are less productive (in terms of TFP) or have more 
distortions; not because they are capital scarce. Caselli (2005) and Gourinchas and Jeanne 
(2005) provide further theoretical support (and some evidence based on parameterizations of 
growth models) for the notion that it is TFP growth rather than capital accumulation that is 
crucial for long-term growth. 
 
                                                 
39 The question of what determines the large cross-country differences in output growth has motivated 
an extensive literature. Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) come down strongly on the side of factor 
accumulation as the key determinant. The influential paper of Hall and Jones (1999) changed the 
terms of the debate and it has now come to be accepted as conventional wisdom that TFP growth is 
far more important than factor accumulation. The debate is far from settled, however. Bosworth and 
Collins (2003) argue that many previous studies over-estimate the importance of TFP growth; they 
argue that factor accumulation and TFP growth are about equally important, even for long-run 
growth. By contrast, Jones and Olken (2005) present evidence that TFP growth fluctuations constitute 
the primary determinant of not just long-term but also short-term growth. In the context of the Asian 
newly industrialized countries, Young (1995) argues that capital accumulation was the main driver of 
growth in those countries during the miracle years, a view disputed by Hsieh (2002).   - 37 -   
Indeed, this literature may provide a useful guide to where one should be looking for the 
benefits of financial integration. Ultimately, if financial integration is to have a lasting effect 
on growth, it must be by moving economies closer to their production possibility frontiers by 
eliminating various distortions and creating efficiency gains, including in financial 
intermediation, technological adoption etc.  
 
The hypothesis that financial integration raises TFP growth has not yet been investigated 
carefully in the literature. An early exception is a paper by Edwards (2001a), who looks at 
this issue rather cursorily and concludes that, while there is some evidence that financial 
integration increases TFP growth, the evidence is not robust. More recently, Bonfiglioli 
(2006) and Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2006b) have assembled some preliminary evidence 
suggesting that financial integration raises TFP growth. Some of the literature on the effects 
of equity market liberalization and FDI flows discussed above does show, using micro data, 
how capital inflows result in efficiency gains at the micro level. Clearly, there is more work 
to be done and this seems to us an important dimension of the future research program on the 
macroeconomic effects of financial integration.  
 
D.   Summary 
Our conceptual framework can be summarized as follows. The first point is that financial 
integration should generate a number of indirect but important benefits; the second is that 
these benefits should then boost growth. Indeed, these ancillary benefits could, in some ways, 
be more important than the direct effects of external financing on investment growth. The 
fact that well-developed and efficient financial sectors, good institutions, and sound 
macroeconomic policies contribute to higher growth is, in our view, relatively non-
controversial (although there may not be a consensus about the magnitude of these causal 
relationships).  
 
Hence, we turn our attention next to building the case for the first piece of our argument—
that financial globalization has significant collateral benefits. As noted above, a corollary of 
our reasoning is of course that these benefits should show up in TFP growth; this we leave to 
future research.  
 
Following that, we review the literature on threshold conditions. The basic idea here is that 
whether or not initial conditions are above threshold levels in some dimensions is crucial for 
determining growth and volatility outcomes. This literature could be important for 
understanding why the macroeconomic evidence on the growth effects of financial 
integration is rather mixed, while the microeconomic evidence finds more positive effects.  
 
VIII.   COLLATERAL BENEFITS OF FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION 
Although financial globalization is, in theory, supposed to work its magic through increased 
capital flows, there are, as discussed above, indirect benefits to undertaking financial 
globalization that are arguably of greater potential importance than the direct benefits. We 
now review the evidence for three key areas in which the indirect benefits ought to be 
important—financial sector development, institutional quality, and macroeconomic policies.  
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Figure 6 shows that, during the recent period of financial globalization (1985–2004), there is 
indeed a strong positive correlation between financial openness and measures of financial 
development and institutional quality, and a negative correlation between financial openness 
and log inflation. The correlation with the government budget deficit is, however, essentially 
zero.
40  
 
Formal empirical evidence suggests strongly that financial integration boosts domestic 
financial market development, although this does not, of course, rule out the possibility that 
de facto financial integration is fostered by a well-developed financial sector. Although there 
is a strong presumption in the literature that financial globalization improves institutional 
quality and governance, the empirical evidence—most of which is very recent—is limited. 
The evidence that financial globalization disciplines macroeconomic policies is weak and 
fraught with a number of problems.   
 
A.   Financial Sector Development 
An area that has received a fair amount of attention is the issue of whether international 
financial flows indeed serve as an important catalyst for domestic financial market 
development, as reflected in both straightforward measures of the size of the banking sector 
and equity markets as well as broader concepts of financial market development, including 
supervision and regulation. 
 
There is a large body of theory suggesting that foreign ownership of banks can, in principle, 
generate a variety of benefits (e.g., Levine, 1997, 2005; Mishkin, 2006). First, foreign bank 
participation can make a country’s access to international financial markets easier. Second, it 
can help improve the regulatory and supervisory frameworks of the domestic banking 
industry. Third, it can improve the quality of loans as the influence of the government on the 
financial sector should decline in more open economies. Fourth, in practice, foreign banks 
may introduce new financial instruments and technologies which can increase competition 
and improve the quality of financial services. The presence of foreign banks can also provide 
a safety valve when depositors become worried about the solvency of domestic banks. 
 
What does the empirical evidence say? Work based on a variety of techniques, including 
country case studies, does seem to support the notion that increased foreign bank presence 
raises competition and appears to lead to a decline in both bank overhead costs and profits.
41  
As for equity markets, the overwhelming theoretical presumption is that foreign entry 
increases efficiency and the evidence seems to support this channel. For example, applying 
                                                 
40 As in Figure 5, we excluded a few countries that were outliers. Inclusion of all the countries in our 
sample strengthened all of the unconditional results reported here. We emphasize that these plots 
show only unconditional correlations, so we do not wish to make too much of them.  
41 See Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Huizinga (2001); Errunza (2001); Levine (2001); Claessens 
and Laeven (2003); Clarke, Cull, Martinez Peria, and Sanchez (2003); and Schmukler (2003) One 
cannot, however, rule out the view that, in very poor countries, the entry of foreign banks could wipe 
out domestic banks and thereby have detrimental effects on access to financing for small- and 
medium-sized enterprises (Detragiache, Gupta, and Tressel, 2006).   - 39 -   
an event study approach to data from 16 emerging markets, Levine and Zervos (1998) report 
that stock markets tend to become larger and more liquid after equity market liberalizations. 
In the same vein, Karolyi (2004) finds that the growth of ADRs in emerging markets could 
have a positive impact on the development of the local stock markets. In a cross-county 
regression framework, Chinn and Ito (2005), however, identify one possible caveat. While 
they find that financial openness contributes to equity market development once a certain 
moderate level of legal and institutional development has been attained (a hurdle cleared by 
most emerging markets), less developed countries do not necessarily gain this benefit.  
 
A number of studies also find that international financial integration helps overall financial 
sector development.
42 For instance, Bailliu (2000) and Klein and Olivei (2006) find that, in 
financially integrated economies, the degree of domestic financial sector development is 
higher than in countries that maintain restrictions on capital account transactions. 
 
B.   Institutional Quality and Governance 
Another focus of the recent literature on “collateral benefits” has been on the relationship 
between financial globalization and corporate governance. More recent work has started to 
examine the implications of financial globalization for broader public governance, as well as 
for the relationship between corporate and public governance. However, the evidence on 
these two latter points is rather limited at this stage.  
 
Corporate governance 
 
Stulz (2005) discusses some channels through which globalization could improve corporate 
governance and thereby reduce the cost of capital. Foreign investors may have skills and 
information technologies that allow them to monitor management better than local investors. 
Globalization also transforms the market for corporate control—it increases the monitoring 
of managers both by existing shareholders and potential external bidders. Stulz (2005) argues 
that financial globalization weakens certain agency problems by reducing the cost of outside 
finance, thereby creating incentives for firms that use more external finance to improve their 
governance. A missing step in this logic is that improved governance gives firms more access 
to external capital—there is as yet little evidence on this. Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004) 
note that financial globalization may lead to greater investment in governance for another 
reason, namely that it reduces the cost of such investments.  
 
The empirical evidence on financial globalization and corporate governance, while still 
relatively sparse, does seem to support the notion that increased foreign competition leads to 
better corporate governance. A volume edited by Cornelius and Kogut (2003) has a set of 
papers by academics and practitioners discussing how financial globalization has induced 
some countries to adjust their corporate governance structures in response to demands from 
                                                 
42 Mishkin (2006) enumerates various direct and indirect channels through which financial 
globalization could have a positive impact on financial sector development. He argues that foreign 
financial institutions could lead to improvements in the quality of domestic prudential supervision and 
could be instrumental in the reform of domestic regulatory institutions.   - 40 -   
international investors. Goldberg (2004) surveys the literature about the implications of 
financial-sector FDI and argues that financial-sector FDI from well-regulated and well-
supervised source countries can support emerging market institutional development and 
governance. Morck, Wolfenzen, and Yeung (2005) document that, in many countries, small 
numbers of controlling shareholders (often a few wealthy families) tend to govern a vast 
number of listed public companies through corporate pyramids, cross-holdings, and other 
devices. The corporate governance problems associated with this phenomenon can be 
mitigated by financial globalization, in part by raising expectations and demands among local 
investors through exposure to better standards of governance. Kim, Sung, and Wei (2006) 
report some evidence that foreign investment has improved corporate governance in the 
Republic of Korea.   
 
Public governance and corruption 
 
There is a nascent body of research on the linkage between financial globalization and public 
governance (as measured by corruption, red tape, transparency of government policies, etc.). 
For example, poor public governance as measured by severity of bureaucratic corruption 
discourages inward FDI (Wei, 2000a) while poor governance as measured by lack of 
government transparency discourages portfolio equity inflows (Gelos and Wei, 2005). 
 
O f course, public and corporate governance issues are deeply interconnected. Doidge, 
Karolyi, and Stulz (2005) explore the relative importance of country and firm characteristics 
in explaining firm-level variations in corporate governance around the world. They find that, 
for two out of their three measures of corporate governance, country characteristics explain 
over seventy percent of the variation. This suggests that, without good overall public 
governance, there is limited hope of improvements in corporate governance. 
  
They also find, however, that listing on a stock exchange in a country with a substantially 
better court system, less corrupt bureaucracy, and stricter disclosure requirements is one way 
to “rent” good public governance in order to improve corporate governance. Doidge, Karolyi, 
and Stulz (2004) present some evidence that, when a foreign firm lists in the United States, 
its value increases. This suggests that by listing in the United States and subjecting itself to 
U.S. laws and regulations, a foreign firm can make a credible commitment to better 
governance practices, including protection of the rights of minority shareholders.  
 
Political economy considerations enter into the picture as well, with financial integration 
helping to shake loose power structures that allow certain groups to thwart reforms. Rajan 
and Zingales (2003) propose an interest group theory wherein financial sector development is 
obstructed by incumbents who could be hurt by the competition that it fosters. When an 
economy allows cross-border trade and financial flows, it weakens incumbents’ opposition to 
reforms and facilitates financial sector development. These authors find some support in the 
cross-sectional and time-series dimensions of historical data to support this theory.   
 
C.   Macroeconomic Policies 
We have already discussed how capital account liberalization might impose discipline on 
macroeconomic policies since it increases the potential costs associated with weak policies   - 41 -   
and enhances the benefits of good ones. Precisely because capital account liberalization 
makes a country more vulnerable to sudden shifts in global investor sentiment, it can serve as  
a signal of commitment to better macroeconomic policies.
43 Indeed, even skeptics about the 
benefits of financial integration such as Stiglitz (2000) have accepted that this is likely to be 
one of the most important potential benefits of capital account liberalization. Unfortunately, 
while the empirical evidence is suggestive, it remains sparse.  
 
Monetary and fiscal policies 
 
The fact that the recent period of financial globalization has been marked by disinflationary 
trends in virtually all economies around the world has led some authors to contend that 
financial globalization improves monetary policy outcomes. Rogoff (2004) argues forcefully 
that globalization has fostered rising competition in goods and labor markets (which reduces 
price levels and also increases wage and price flexibility), thereby making the real effects of 
unanticipated monetary policy actions smaller and more transitory. Consequently, there is 
less incentive for central banks to pursue inflationary policies (and less incentive for 
politicians to pressure them to do so).  
 
In any event, financial openness appears to complicate monetary policy implementation in 
developing countries (Wagner, 2002; and Hawkins, 2005). For instance, globalization 
increases uncertainty about the output gap (more exposure to productivity shocks emanating 
abroad), the inflation gap (through the effects of inflows on asset prices) and the monetary 
transmission mechanism (central banks have less control over the operations of domestic 
commercial banks). Whether these factors improve monetary policy outcomes is, however, 
not clear, although the fact that so many emerging markets have successfully instituted more 
independent, inflation-focused central banks, is quite noteworthy.  
 
The very limited research on how globalization affects fiscal outcomes has been done mostly 
by political scientists. For instance, using data on member countries of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) for the period 1960–94, Garrett and 
Mitchell (2001) find some weak evidence that capital account openness may be negatively 
associated with government consumption or spending. Kim (2003) finds some evidence that 
capital account liberalization helps to reduce fiscal deficits. Unfortunately, such papers 
typically use only de jure measures of capital account openness and rarely deal with potential 
problems of spurious correlations, reverse causality, or endogeneity bias.  
 
Tytell and Wei (2004) systematically examine the disciplining effect of capital flows on both 
monetary and fiscal policies. They attempt to account for potential endogeneity of observed 
capital flows in a given country with respect to macroeconomic policies in that country. They 
                                                 
43 See Bartolini and Drazen (1997), Tytell and Wei (2004), and Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006). Many 
countries have, in fact, received significant capital inflows upon removing restrictions on outflows 
(see Mathieson and Rojas-Suarez, 1993; Laban and Larrain, 1997). Rodrik (2001) and Tytell and Wei 
(2004) note that the policy discipline effect would be weaker if international investment were driven 
by herding, momentum trading, or other patterns of flows that are not related to economic 
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find that countries with higher levels of financial openness are more likely to generate better 
monetary policy outcomes in terms of lower inflation. However, there is no evidence of a 
systematic relationship between financial openness and better fiscal policies.  
 
Choice of exchange rate regime 
 
Openness to capital flows can have important implications for the trade-offs among different 
exchange rate regimes.  We will, however, defer this discussion until Section IX, where we 
will point to the fact that countries are much better able to handle international capital flows 
if they either have a more flexible exchange rate regime or meet the extremely stringent pre-
conditions to sustain a peg.    
 
D.   Implications 
While we can hardly argue that the evidence that we have surveyed in this section is decisive, 
it does consistently point to a role for international financial integration as a catalyst for 
financial sector and institutional development, in line with our schematic view about the 
channels through which financial globalization affects growth. Some evidence of a catalytic 
role in improving macroeconomic policies is also present. Given the difficulties that we have 
identified in interpreting the cross-country growth evidence, it is useful to see that financial 
market integration seems to be operating through some of the indirect channels. 
Before turning to the implications of this line of reasoning, we review the literature on a 
closely-related matter—the main factors that affect the benefits and risks of financial 
globalization. 
 
IX.   THRESHOLD EFFECTS IN OUTCOMES OF FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION 
We turn now to a fuller discussion of four sets of structural and policy-related features that 
appear to interact with financial globalization in important ways to determine the eventual 
macroeconomic outcomes and also influence the short-run tradeoffs. This list includes 
financial sector development, overall institutional quality, the macroeconomic policy 
framework and trade integration.
44 Each of these factors has in its own right been shown to 
influence growth, but our interest here is in the narrower question of how they affect the 
outcomes (in terms of growth and volatility) of financial integration. As we noted earlier, 
there is a great deal of similarity between the list of collateral benefits of financial integration 
and the list of threshold conditions that we discuss below. Indeed, this discussion highlights 
the difficulties involved in trying to make strong causal statements about the effects of 
financial integration.   
 
                                                 
44 Another threshold effect, on which the literature is still rather limited, is related to human capital. 
Borensztein, De Gregorio, and Lee (1998), and Blonigen and Wang (2005) find that countries that 
have more human capital get larger growth benefits from FDI. Xu (2000) finds that U.S. 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) make a larger contribution to productivity growth in developed 
countries than in developing ones; his interpretation is that, in order to benefit from technological 
spillovers from MNEs, a country needs good human capital.   - 43 -   
A.   Interaction Between Financial Sector Development and Financial Integration  
Financial sector development is a key determinant of the extent of growth and stability 
benefits associated with financial globalization. It not only enhances the growth benefits but 
also reduces vulnerability to crises, through both direct and indirect channels.
45 Mishkin 
(2006) emphasizes that inadequate or mismanaged domestic financial sector liberalizations 
have been a major contributor to crises that may be associated with financial integration.  
 
Evidence 
 
Recent research provides empirical evidence supportive of the view that financial sector 
development amplifies the growth benefits associated with FDI flows. Using a large sample 
of developing countries over the period 1970–95, Hermes and Lensink (2003) find that, in 
order to enjoy the growth benefits of FDI, a threshold level of financial sector development is 
a prerequisite. While more than half of the countries in their sample (mostly in Latin America 
and Asia) appear to meet the necessary threshold, almost all of the countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa, with their relatively weak financial systems, are below this level. Alfaro, Chanda, 
Kalemli-Ozcan, and Sayek (2004) and Durham (2004) also find that the growth impact of 
FDI is stronger in economies with well-developed financial sectors.
46 
 
Financial sector development also improves the growth benefits of equity flows. BHL find 
that financial market development enhances the growth benefits of equity market 
liberalizations. Oddly, however, their results are weaker when they use equity market 
turnover rather than the ratio of private credit to GDP to measure financial development. 
 
Another major benefit of financial sector development is its positive impact on 
macroeconomic stability, which in turn has implications for the volume and composition of 
capital flows. In theory, by expanding the scope of diversification possibilities, developed 
financial markets moderate the effects of shocks and help reduce macroeconomic volatility.
47  
Economic crises in emerging markets have repeatedly demonstrated the importance of deep 
and well-supervised domestic financial markets during the process of financial integration. 
                                                 
45 Well-developed domestic financial markets are instrumental in efficiently allocating foreign 
financial flows to competing investment projects (see Aoki, Benigno, and Kiyotaki, 2006). Deep 
domestic financial markets can also provide the necessary credit to local firms when they need 
financing to take advantage of technological spillovers associated with FDI. Developed financial 
markets enhance macroeconomic stability⎯an important determinant of the volume and composition 
of foreign financial flows. 
46 In the sample of Alfaro and others, a one standard deviation increase in financial development (the 
ratio of private sector credit to GDP) would raise the annual growth rate of a country receiving the 
mean level of FDI inflows by 0.6 percentage points. Durham reports that an increase from the 
minimum to the average (maximum) level of financial development in his sample is associated with a 
0.4 (4.3) percentage points increase in per capita GDP growth, for the average in-sample level of FDI 
flows. 
47 See Easterly, Islam, and Stiglitz (2001); Beck, Lundberg, and Majnoni (2001); Denizer, Iyigun, and 
Owen (2002); and Larrain (2004).   - 44 -   
Mishkin (2006) discusses how, after capital account liberalization, excessive risk taking by 
domestic banks played a major role in triggering the financial crises in Mexico in 1994 and 
many East Asian countries in 1997. Ishii and others (2002) document that countries with 
stronger financial systems generally avoided crises following capital account liberalization. 
However, countries with underdeveloped and poorly supervised financial markets suffered 
financial crises after liberalizing their capital accounts. Sudden changes in the direction of 
capital flows tend to induce or exacerbate boom-bust cycles in developing countries which 
lack deep financial sectors that could help cope with the volatility of these flows (Caballero 
and Krishnamurthy, 2001; Aghion and Banerjee, 2005). 
B.   Role of Institutions and Governance in Driving Growth  
Benefits of Financial Integration 
 
Institutional quality appears to play an important role in determining not just the outcomes of 
financial integration but the level of de facto integration itself. Furthermore, institutional 
quality also appears to have a strong influence on the composition of inflows into developing 
economies, which is another channel through which it affects macroeconomic outcomes. 
 
Klein (2005) finds evidence of a non-monotonic interaction between institutional quality and 
the responsiveness of growth to capital account liberalization. Interestingly, he finds a 
statistically significant and economically meaningful effect of capital account openness on 
growth among countries that have better (but not the best) institutions. He notes a strong 
correlation between institutional quality and income per capita, implying that countries that 
get the most growth benefits from capital account liberalization are upper-middle-income 
countries. Chanda (2005) finds that the cross-country relationship between capital controls 
and growth depends on the degree of ethnic heterogeneity, which he interprets as a proxy for 
rent-seeking and common pool problems. For countries with more heterogeneity (more 
competing groups), capital controls lead to greater inefficiencies and lower growth.  
 
Effects on levels of total flows 
 
Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych (2006) analyze why capital doesn’t flow from rich 
to poor countries, as predicted by neoclassical models. They conclude that institutional 
quality is the most important factor determining capital flows to developing countries. 
Financial globalization could even result in capital flows from poor (and poorly governed) 
countries to rich ones. Collier, Hoeffler, and Pattillo (2001) report regression results, based 
on data for the 1980s from 43 countries, that worsening governance is linked with a rise in 
capital flight.  
 
Effects on levels of FDI and equity inflows 
 
Governance and institutional indicators seem to have a quantitatively significant influence on 
FDI inflows. Based on the distribution of U.S. multinational firms around the world, Hines 
(1995) reports that American companies tend to invest less in destination countries where 
levels of corruption are higher. Using bilateral stocks of FDI from 12 OECD source countries 
to 45 host countries, Wei (2000c) shows that countries’ corruption levels are negatively 
associated with inward FDI. An increase in the corruption level from that of Singapore to that   - 45 -   
of Russia has the same negative effect on FDI as raising the marginal corporate tax rate by as 
much as 50 percentage points. Moreover, for any given level of corruption, less centralized 
and more arbitrary types of corruption tend to discourage FDI even more strongly. 
Better governance also appears to lead to more equity inflows. Based on country allocations 
of over 300 international mutual funds, Gelos and Wei (2005) find that better institutions—
measured by high degrees of government and corporate transparency—attract more foreign 
equity investment relative to the prediction of the international capital asset pricing model.  
 
Effects on composition of inflows 
 
There is a considerable body of evidence that institutions affect the structure of a country’s 
capital inflows in a systematic way. This has important consequences since the composition 
of inflows seems to have strong predictive power for currency crashes. In particular, the 
share of FDI in a country’s total capital inflows is negatively associated with the probability 
of a currency crisis (see, e.g., Frankel and Rose, 1996; Frankel and Wei, 2005). Other 
dimensions of composition are the maturity structure of external debt (the greater the share of 
short-term debt, the more likely a crisis), and the currency denomination of external debt (the 
greater the share of foreign currency debt, the more likely a crisis). 
 
Wei (2000a, 2000b, 2001) and Wei and Wu (2002) suggest that countries with better public 
institutions are more likely to attract more direct investment relative to bank loans. These 
authors provide evidence based on total inflows (based on data from the IMF’s Balance-of-
Payments Statistics) and bilateral flows from source to destination countries (based on 
bilateral FDI data from the OECD and bilateral bank lending data from the BIS).  
 
Faria and Mauro (2005) find that better institutional quality helps tilt a country’s capital 
structure towards FDI and portfolio equity flows which, as noted earlier, tend to bring more 
of the collateral benefits of financial integration. These authors find that, in a cross-section of 
emerging markets and other developing countries, equity-like liabilities as a share of 
countries’ total external liabilities (or as a share of GDP) are positively associated with 
indicators of institutional quality.
48  
 
Do institutions really tilt inflows toward FDI? 
 
Hausmann and Fernandez-Arias (2000) provide a contrarian view on the determinants and 
implications of the composition of flows to developing countries. They argue that countries 
that are poorer, riskier, more volatile, less financially developed, and have weaker institutions 
tend to attract less capital, but more of it in the form of FDI. Hence, a declining share of FDI 
in the context of rising overall flows may be a good sign. Albuquerque (2003) argues that 
financially constrained countries are likely to get more FDI than other types of flows since it 
                                                 
48 Their measure of institutional quality is an average of six indicators—voice and accountability, 
political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, 
and control of corruption—from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003). Faria and Mauro 
instrument the institutional index using settler mortality (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001) 
and ethno-linguistic fragmentation. The IV approach reaffirms their basic conclusion.   - 46 -   
is harder to expropriate—not because it is more productive or intrinsically less volatile. 
Using measures of creditworthiness and credit risk ratings as measures of financing 
constraints, he finds some evidence in support of this hypothesis.  
 
To reconcile the results of these two papers with those of other authors, it turns out to be 
crucial to distinguish between two classes of institutions: (i) property rights institutions, as 
proxied by control of corruption, control of expropriation risks, judicial independence, and 
government transparency; and (ii) financial institutions, as represented by measures of stock 
market and/or banking sector development, credit worthiness, and credit risk rating.  
 
Ju and Wei (2006) provide a framework to think about how different institutions may affect 
patterns of international capital flows. In their model, a developing country that is financially 
underdeveloped would experience an exodus of domestic savings. However, because the 
country has a low capital-to-labor ratio, multinational firms come in to take advantage of low 
wage rates and high profit opportunities as they do not have to rely on inefficient local 
financial institutions for financing. Thus, a country may simultaneously experience a large 
FDI inflow and an outflow of domestic financial capital. By contrast, poor property rights 
institutions could lead to an exodus of domestic savings but, by reducing profit opportunities 
for both foreign and domestic firms, would not generate compensating inflows of FDI.  
 
Viewed from this angle, Albuquerque’s (2003) finding of a negative association between 
financial institutions and the share of FDI in total inflows as attributable to his focus on 
financial development. Hausmann and Fernandez-Arias (2000) confound financial 
development and property rights institutions, which is why they fail to find a clear-cut 
relationship between institutions and the share of FDI in total inflows. It is also worth noting 
that neither of these papers uses IV estimation to deal with potential endogeneity issues. 
 
Re-examining how institutions affect the composition of capital inflows, but distinguishing 
between property rights and financial institutions, Wei (2006) finds that weaker property 
rights and higher levels of corruption do reduce the share of FDI in total foreign liabilities, 
consistent with earlier papers. On the other hand, lower financial sector development is 
associated with a higher share of FDI in total foreign liabilities.  
 
C.   Why Do Macroeconomic Policies Affect the Outcomes of Financial Integration? 
There is a large literature tying the quality of domestic macroeconomic policies to the level 
and composition of inflows as well as vulnerability to crises.
49 A number of papers focusing 
                                                 
49 The importance of macroeconomic policies is not uniformly accepted. Acemoglu, Johnson, 
Robinson, and Thaicharoen (2003) note that countries with high inflation, large budget deficits and 
misaligned exchange rates do appear to have suffered more macroeconomic volatility (and posted 
lower growth) during the postwar period. But they argue that weak macroeconomic policies are 
symptoms of underlying institutional problems including the absence of institutions that restrain rent-
seeking political elites, ineffective enforcement of property rights, widespread corruption, and 
political instability. Albouy (2006) has contested the consistency of the data underlying the 
instrument—settler mortality—used by these authors for the institutional quality variable. Glaeser, 
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on sequencing of liberalization argue that capital account liberalization is more likely to be 
successful if it is implemented in an environment supported by sound fiscal, monetary, and 
exchange rate policies (e.g., Eichengreen, 2000). 
 
Ishii and others (2002) presents a case study analysis that underscores the importance of 
stable macroeconomic policies for averting crises in countries with open capital accounts.
50 
Mody and Murshid (2005) examine how policies affect the relationship between financial 
flows and domestic investment growth in a larger dataset covering 60 countries over the 
period 1979–99 (they use a composite variable of macroeconomic policy quality constructed 
by the World Bank). They conclude that financial flows have a stronger impact on 
investment growth in countries with better macro policies. In models of early warning 
systems, proxies for exchange rate and monetary policies appear to be important for 
predicting financial crises.
51  
 
Arteta, Eichengreen, and Wyplosz (2003) examine whether bad macroeconomic policies can 
hurt growth. They are unable to find evidence to support this proposition. But they report 
some evidence that is consistent with the importance of threshold effects in generating 
positive growth effects of financial openness. These positive effects are present only when 
macroeconomic imbalances that lead to inconsistencies between the administered exchange 
rate and other policies have first been eliminated (i.e., if there is no large black market 
premium). They find no evidence that the effects of capital account liberalization vary with 
financial depth, but do find that its effects vary with the rule of law.  
 
Exchange rate regime 
 
Fixed exchange rate regimes in principle provide a transparent and credible monetary anchor, 
an important consideration for many developing economies. But it comes at a significant 
cost—the loss of monetary independence. The trade-off between monetary stability and 
independence is one where it is difficult to draw general prescriptive conclusions. What the 
evidence does show is that an open capital account puts a greater burden on other policies 
and structural features of the economy (e.g., product and labor market flexibility) to support a 
fixed exchange rate. In particular, for economies with weak financial systems, an open 
capital account and a fixed exchange rate regime are not an auspicious combination. Indeed, 
there is a compelling case to be made that rigid exchange rate regimes can make a country 
                                                                                                                                                       
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2004) argue that the importance of institutions has been 
overplayed and that the level of human capital may be a far more important determinant of growth. 
50 Austria and Hungary, for example, were able to avoid crises after they liberalized their capital 
accounts since they had relatively stable macroeconomic policies. Mexico and Turkey ran into 
difficulties in the mid-1990s after liberalizing their capital accounts since they had tightly managed 
exchange rates for a prolonged period, along with uncertain policy settings and growing imbalances.  
51 See Berg, Borenzstein, and Pattillo (2004). Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1995) show that these 
issues are relevant for more advanced economies as well. Using quarterly panel data for 20 OECD 
countries over the period 1959–93, they document that high money and credit growth as well as large 
deficits in current account and fiscal positions tend to raise the probability of devaluations.   - 48 -   
more vulnerable to crises when it opens its capital markets (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995). It 
can be argued that, in the absence of de facto or de jure fixed rates, most of the crises of the 
1990s, from Mexico to Asia to Russia to Brazil, might have been much less virulent, or 
might even have been avoided entirely. Fischer (2001) also comes around to this conclusion.   
 
The problems posed by fixed exchange rates for monetary independence has been 
emphasized in the context of China by Eichengreen (2005) and Prasad, Rumbaugh and Wang 
(2005). These authors argue that moving toward greater exchange rate flexibility would give 
China some degree of monetary independence from the United States. But they note that 
capital account liberalization should be a lower priority given the weak state of the domestic 
banking system. Appendix I in the paper by Prasad, Rumbaugh, and Wang surveys a number 
of industrial and developing country experiences showing that the combination of capital 
account liberalization and a fixed exchange rate regime have often ended in forced and messy 
exits to more flexible exchange rate regimes.  
 
However, the literature does not imply that fixed exchange rates are necessarily a problem 
for countries that are at early stages of domestic financial development or that they are 
inappropriate prior to international capital market liberalization. Husain, Mody, and Rogoff 
(2005) and Aghion, Bacchetta, Ranciere, and Rogoff (2006) find that poorer developing 
countries seem to enjoy faster growth and lower inflation with relatively fixed rates.   
 
Using the de facto approach to classifying exchange rate regimes developed by Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2004), Husain, Mody, and Rogoff (2005) find that pegged exchange rate regimes 
confer some advantages such as lower inflation upon developing countries that do not have 
much exposure to international capital. For emerging markets, standard measures of 
macroeconomic performance are not systematically associated with the nature of the 
exchange rate regime, but the likelihood of financial crises is higher for countries with 
pegged or nearly pegged exchange rates. Husain, Mody, and Rogoff attribute the latter result 
under a regime with “hard commitment” to the inability to adapt to changed circumstances, 
the incentives of economic agents including entrepreneurs and financial intermediaries to 
undertake risky activities on the presumption that exchange rates will not change, and 
speculative pressures from investors who seek to test the commitment.
52   
 
Wyplosz (2004) highlights the difficulties and risks associated with maintaining currency 
pegs when the capital account is open. As a short-term strategy for developing economies, he 
recommends a combination of a soft peg or managed exchange rate regime along with well-
designed limits on capital mobility. Maintaining either a free float or a hard peg along with 
capital account openness requires a strong commitment to fostering good institutions, 
especially with respect to financial market regulation and supervision.   
 
                                                 
52 These authors also find that that banking crises are more likely under rigid exchange rate regimes. 
They note that this result is opposite to that of Ghosh, Gulde, and Wolf (2003) and trace the 
differences to the latter authors’ use of a de jure exchange rate regime classification.   - 49 -   
D.   Does the Level of Trade Openness Matter for the Effects of Financial Openness? 
Trade integration appears to have a better cost-benefit tradeoff than financial integration. It 
also reduces the probability of crises associated with financial openness and mitigates the 
costs of such crises if they do occur. Thus, the recent literature strengthens the case made by 
the old sequencing literature for putting trade liberalization ahead of financial integration. 
 
Recent research shows how interactions between trade and financial integration could affect 
macroeconomic outcomes. Trade integration reduces the likelihood of financial crises 
associated with sudden stops and current account reversals. Less open economies have to 
undergo larger real exchange rate depreciations for a given current account adjustment, face 
more severe balance sheet effects stemming from these depreciations, and, as a result, are 
more likely to default on their debt obligations. This creates a link between the probability of 
sudden stops and the likelihood of default, implying that more open economies are less 
vulnerable to sudden stops because of their lower probability of default.  
 
Is the impact of trade openness on the likelihood of sudden stops empirically important? 
Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejia (2004) show that trade openness indeed makes countries less 
vulnerable to financial crises, including sudden stops and currency crashes; controlling for 
the endogeneity of trade strengthens this effect. Frankel and Cavallo (2004) and Cavallo 
(2005) report similar findings. They conclude that a 10 percentage point increase in trade 
openness reduces the probability of a sudden stop by about 30 percent.
53  
 
Some papers argue that trade integration should play an important role in mitigating the 
adverse growth effects of financial crises and in facilitating recoveries from crises. The real 
costs of financial crises depend on the degree of openness of an economy since less open 
economies have to go through larger contractions of aggregate demand and/or larger changes 
to the real exchange rate change in order to adjust to large shocks. Trade integration could 
help a developing economy to export its way out of a recession since a given exchange rate 
depreciation would have a larger impact on its export revenues than in a less open economy.
54 
Export revenues could also help service external debt, which is quite substantial in a number 
of developing countries. These predictions are supported by recent empirical research 
showing that, among countries that have experienced sudden stops and current account 
reversals, those that are more open to trade suffer smaller adverse growth effects.
55  
                                                 
53 For a more detailed analysis of the causes and effects of sudden stops, see Mendoza (2006) and 
references therein.  
54 Calvo and Talvi (2005) argue that this is why the collapse of capital flows to Argentina and Chile 
in the 1990s had a smaller impact on Chile. Kose, Meredith, and Towe (2004) analyze the impact of 
NAFTA and argue that trade integration has made the Mexican economy more resilient to shocks and 
contributed to its faster recovery from the 1994–95 peso crisis than from the 1982 debt crisis.  
55 See Edwards (2004, 2005), Desai and Mitra (2004), and Guidotti, Sturzenegger, and Villar (2004). 
Edwards (2005) reports that a decline in trade openness by roughly 30 percentage points increases the 
negative effect of a current account reversal on growth by approximately 1.2 percentage points. He 
finds that capital account restrictiveness, on the other hand, does not affect the intensity with which 
(continued…)   - 50 -   
 
While trade integration can apparently proceed well even in the absence of financial 
integration, financial integration in the absence of trade integration could lead to a 
misallocation of resources. Eichengreen (2001) notes that, under these circumstances, capital 
inflows may be directed to sectors in which a country doesn’t have a comparative advantage. 
 
Indeed, trade integration in general seems to be less risky than financial integration. Martin 
and Rey (2006) highlight this point in a model in which trade integration has a positive 
growth effect, but financial integration can lead to asset price crashes and financial crises. 
While earlier models in the literature point to various types of market failures—including 
credit constraints and moral hazard problems—as the main culprits of financial crises, these 
authors argue that costs associated with international trade in goods and assets alone could 
increase the vulnerability of developing countries to financial crises.
56 The model has a clear 
implication—consistent with the received wisdom—that developing countries should 
liberalize trade in goods before trade in financial assets. 
 
E.   Threshold Effects and Composition of Inflows: A Summary 
Our discussion of the factors that improve the cost-benefit calculus of financial globalization 
indicates that there are some basic supporting conditions—thresholds—that determine where 
on the continuum of potential costs and benefits a country ends up. As described in the sub-
sections above, the literature has emphasized threshold effects in different dimensions and 
there is as yet no unified framework to think about the relative importance of each of these 
individual thresholds and what sort of tradeoffs there might be among these thresholds in 
terms of prioritization for a country that wants to seek the benefits of financial globalization 
without exposing itself to too much risk.
57  
 
An alternative way of posing the question about thresholds is to ask if there is any direct 
evidence that capital account openness is bad for growth in countries with underdeveloped 
financial markets, weak institutions or severe macroeconomic imbalances. For instance, 
Eichengreen (2001) conjectures that capital account liberalization can be counterproductive if 
it takes place before severe policy-related distortions have been removed and before domestic 
financial markets, institutions and administrative capacity are strong enough to ensure that 
capital inflows can be channeled productively. Arteta, Eichengreen, and Wyplosz (2003) 
look at this question explicitly and, somewhat comfortingly, find no evidence to support this 
proposition. But, as noted earlier, their results do confirm the importance of threshold effects 
in generating positive growth effects of financial openness. 
                                                                                                                                                       
current account reversals affect real economic activity. He also shows that capital account restrictions 
do not affect the probability of experiencing current account reversals in the first place. 
56 Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001) emphasize the importance of frictions related to trade costs (broadly 
defined) for explaining a number of puzzles in international macroeconomics.  
57 There isn’t a consensus, however, on the importance of threshold effects. Edison, Levine, Ricci, 
and Sløk (2004) are unable to show that financial integration has a larger growth impact in countries 
with more developed financial markets and better macroeconomic policies and institutions.   - 51 -   
 
A different threshold is related to the level of integration itself. Industrial economies, which 
are far more integrated into global financial markets are clearly able to do better than 
emerging markets in terms of using international capital flows to efficiently allocate capital, 
using it to generate TFP gains and share income risk. Does this mean that the only hope for 
developing countries to realize the full benefits is to attain high levels of financial integration 
similar to that of industrial economies and that the risks en route are unavoidable? After all, 
if the short-term costs take the form of crises, they could have persistent negative effects that 
detract from the long-term growth benefits. Furthermore, the distributional effects associated 
with these short-term consequences can be particularly painful for low-income countries. 
 
Some comfort may still be provided by a newly developing literature on how globalization 
affects the relationship between growth and volatility. While macroeconomic volatility does 
have a negative effect on growth, this relationship is attenuated for more open economies 
(Kose, Prasad, and Terrones, 2005, 2006a). That is, economies that are more open to trade 
and financial flows are able to tolerate higher levels of volatility—other things being equal—
than less open economies, without this volatility having an adverse effect on growth.
58 
Furthermore, some of the collateral benefits generated by financial integration, including 
macroeconomic discipline and financial market development, could also reduce volatility.  
 
X.   CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We conclude by highlighting our main findings and then noting some areas where we think 
future research could have significant payoffs. 
 
A.   Main Findings 
Measuring the extent of a country’s integration into global financial markets is an important 
but complicated issue. In particular, the distinction between de jure and de facto integration 
appears to matter a great deal in understanding the macroeconomic implications of financial 
globalization. The basic problem with de jure measures that capture legal and regulatory 
restrictions on capital flows is that implementation and enforcement differ so greatly across 
countries that international comparisons are dubious. Thus, although most empirical papers 
analyzing the effects of financial integration rely on de jure measures of openness, de facto 
integration measures may be more relevant for analyzing the direct and indirect benefits 
associated with financial globalization. 
 
                                                 
58 Ramey and Ramey (1995), Aghion and Banerjee (2005), and Aizenman and Pinto (2006) document 
the negative relationship between growth and volatility. Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2005, 2006a) 
confirm this result for the recent period of globalization. However, they find that the unconditional 
relationship between growth and volatility is positive for industrial economies. For emerging market 
economies, this relationship is negative before trade and financial liberalization and weakly positive 
after liberalizations have taken place in both dimensions. Formal econometric analysis shows that the 
negative growth-volatility relationship is weakened by trade openness and financial openness, 
although the result for financial openness is weaker and less robust than that for trade openness.   - 52 -   
It is notable that whereas the majority of cross-country empirical studies are unable to find 
robust evidence in support of the growth benefits of capital account liberalization, studies 
that use measures of de facto integration or finer measures of de jure integration tend to find 
more positive results. At the same time, using either approach, there is little systematic 
evidence that capital account liberalization, by itself, increases vulnerability to financial 
crises.  
 
The composition of capital inflows has a substantial influence on the growth benefits of 
financial globalization for developing countries, although the evidence is far from decisive. 
Studies based on both macroeconomic and microeconomic (industry- or firm-level) data find 
that equity market liberalizations have positive effects on output growth. Interestingly, 
despite the general consensus that FDI is the form of capital inflow most likely to spin off 
positive growth benefits, these benefits are harder to detect in aggregate data than is the case 
for equity flows. Fortunately, recent work using micro data is starting to confirm that FDI 
flows do have significantly positive effects on output and productivity growth, especially 
through spillover effects associated with vertical linkages. Overall, studies using micro data 
are better able to detect the growth and productivity gains stemming from financial 
integration as well as the distortionary effects of capital controls. 
 
In addition to the traditional channels such as efficient allocation of capital and expanded 
international risk-sharing opportunities, the growth and stability benefits of financial 
globalization are also realized through a broad set of “collateral benefits”—financial market 
development, better institutions and governance, and macroeconomic discipline. These 
collateral benefits affect growth and stability dynamics indirectly, implying that the 
associated macroeconomic gains may not be fully evident in the short run and may be 
difficult to uncover in cross-country regressions. 
 
Various threshold effects play important roles in shaping the macroeconomic outcomes of 
financial globalization. Some key thresholds are related to the level of development of 
domestic financial markets, the quality of institutions and corporate governance, the nature of 
macroeconomic policies (including the exchange rate regime), and the extent of openness to 
trade. Recent research suggests that countries meeting these threshold conditions are better 
able to reap the growth and stability benefits of financial globalization.  
 
B.   Issues for Further Research 
Our synthesis of the literature on financial globalization, while offering a guardedly positive 
overall assessment, points to some major complications during the transition from low to 
high levels of financial integration. For developing countries, financial globalization appears 
to have the potential to play a catalytic role in generating an array of collateral benefits that 
may help boost long-run growth and welfare. At the same time, premature opening of the 
capital account in the absence of some basic supporting conditions can delay the realization 
of these benefits, while making a country more vulnerable to sudden stops of capital flows. 
Still, we see this as a fundamental tension between the costs and benefits of financial 
globalization that may be difficult to avoid.  
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The collateral benefits perspective presented in this paper does suggest a way for moving 
forward on capital account liberalization. If one can identify which reform priorities are the 
key ones for a particular country, then one can design an approach to capital account 
liberalization that could generate specific benefits while minimizing the associated risks. 
Further research is clearly needed in a number of areas, however before one can derive strong 
policy conclusions about the specifics of such an approach.  
 
First, it is imperative to extend the research program on measuring financial openness. 
Additional work on constructing measures that line up with theoretical notions of what 
integration means would be useful. Understanding the specific channels through which 
different types of inflows affect growth dynamics would also be an important step in 
evaluating their relative benefits.  
 
Research on many of the potential collateral benefits of financial globalization is still in its 
infancy but is growing rapidly. The links between certain aspects of open capital accounts 
(e.g., unrestricted foreign bank entry) and domestic financial sector development have been 
analyzed extensively, but evidence on other indirect benefits is limited. In particular, despite 
the existence of a theoretical literature positing a link between financial globalization and 
governance (both public and corporate), the empirical literature remains sparse. 
 
It is clear from the discussion here that the benefits of financial openness should be more 
apparent in terms of the effects on TFP growth, since per capita income growth also depends 
on physical and human capital accumulation. Empirical evidence on how different types of 
flows affect productivity growth would be an integral part of the research agenda on financial 
openness. Another promising research avenue is a more detailed analysis of threshold 
effects—especially the relative importance of different threshold conditions and the trade-
offs among them for a country contemplating liberalization of its capital account.  
 
A key theme that comes out of our survey of existing empirical studies is that macro-level 
data often do not, and perhaps cannot, offer definitive answers about the effects of financial 
globalization. Further research based on industry- and firm-level data as well as event and 
case studies may provide useful corroborative evidence and, often, more informative insights 
about the channels through which these effects operate. In the meantime, we should 
recognize that some of the more extreme polemical claims made about the effects of financial 
globalization on developing countries, both pro and con, are far less easy to substantiate than 
either side generally cares to admit.   - 54 -   
Table 1. International Financial Integration: Gross Stocks of Foreign Assets and Liabilities 
(in percent unless otherwise specified) 
All  countries (billion U.S. dollars) 7,124 14,957 26,411 46,638 76,133
Share of FDI 15.6 16.6 17.9 20.9 21.8
Share of equity  4.9 7.5 9.5 15.7 15.9
Share of debt  75.1 72.5 69.4 60.0 58.7
Share of other 4.4 3.4 3.3 3.3 3.6
Advanced economies (billion U.S. dollars) 6,100 13,492 23,969 42,052 69,432
Share of FDI 16.1 16.9 17.9 20.7 21.4
Share of equity  5.5 8.1 9.9 16.5 16.5
Share of debt  74.8 72.0 69.7 60.5 59.8
Share of other 3.6 3.0 2.5 2.3 2.3
Emerging markets (billion U.S. dollars) 859 1,259 2,167 4,236 6,221
Share of FDI 12.0 13.3 17.6 23.2 26.6
Share of equity  1.3 2.1 6.1 9.4 10.6
Share of debt  77.9 76.6 64.6 54.4 46.6
Share of other 8.8 8.0 11.7 13.0 16.2
Other developing economies (billion U.S. dollars) 165 207 276 351 480
Share of FDI 16.0 14.0 14.4 18.7 22.7
Share of equity  0.2 0.3 0.3 0.6 1.0
Share of debt  73.8 79.9 78.5 71.3 58.3
Share of other 10.0 5.7 6.8 9.4 18.0
   Notes: Data shown in this table are based on cross-country averages of annual data over the relevant five-year 
period for each group of countries. The sample comprises 21 industrial, 20 emerging market, and 30 other 
developing countries. See Appendix II for a listing of countries in each group. The category "other" includes 
financial derivatives and total reserves minus gold. Shares are in percentage of total. The raw data are based on a 
dataset constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006). 
1980–84 1985–89 1990–94 1995–99 2000–2004
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Table 2. International Financial Integration: Gross Inflows 
(in percent unless otherwise specified) 
All  countries (billion U.S. dollars) 397 803 1,209 2,453 3,564
Share of FDI 12.9 15.8 15.6 21.7 19.6
Share of equity  3.9 7.7 9.4 12.2 12.0
Share of debt  83.2 76.5 75.0 66.1 68.4
Advanced economies (billion U.S. dollars) 325 739 1,008 2,112 3,260
Share of FDI 12.3 14.9 13.9 18.6 16.9
Share of equity  4.4 8.1 9.0 12.5 12.1
Share of debt  83.3 77.0 77.2 68.9 71.0
Emerging markets (billion U.S. dollars) 66 60 194 328 288
Share of FDI 15.5 27.3 24.4 40.7 48.6
Share of equity  1.5 3.4 11.7 11.0 12.1
Share of debt  83.0 69.3 63.9 48.2 39.3
Other developing economies (billion U.S. dollars) 6 4 7 13 16
Share of FDI 15.1 17.2 27.7 40.9 44.2
Share of equity  1.1 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4
Share of debt  83.8 82.2 71.8 58.6 55.4
   Notes: Data shown in this table are based on cross-country averages of annual data over the relevant five-year 
period for each group of countries. Shares are in percentage of total. The sample comprises 21 industrial, 20 
emerging market, and 30 other developing countries. See Appendix II for a listing of countries in each group. 
Authors' calculations are based on flow data from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006). 
1980–84 1985–89 1990–94 1995–99 2000–2004
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Table 3. Volatility of Different Types of Inflows, 1985–2004 
 FDI 
 GDP
 Equity 
 GDP
 Debt 
 GDP
 FDI+Equity 
GDP     
Standard deviation
All countries
Mean 1.90 1.42 4.42 2.78
Median 1.52 0.71 3.15 1.75
Advanced economies
Mean 2.43 2.36 6.18 4.38
Median 1.66 0.87 4.84 2.57
Emerging markets
Mean 1.45 0.84 3.38 1.87
Median 1.31 0.69 2.57 1.83
Other developing economies
Mean 1.76 0.11 3.36 1.76
Median 1.24 0.12 2.65 1.25
Coefficients of variation
All countries
Mean 0.85 0.98 0.76 0.80
Median 0.77 0.98 0.66 0.75
Advanced economies
Mean 0.92 0.99 0.64 0.84
Median 0.87 0.98 0.64 0.77
Emerging markets
Mean 0.75 1.07 0.85 0.71
Median 0.76 1.00 0.67 0.66
Other developing economies
Mean 0.89 0.65 0.80 0.87
Median 0.77 0.70 0.70 0.77
   Notes: Data shown in this table are the cross-country means and medians for each group of 
countries of the standard deviation and coefficient of variation of the different categories of gross 
capital inflows over the period 1985–2004. The coefficient of variation is the standard deviation 
divided by the mean. The sample comprises 21 industrial, 20 emerging market, and 30 other 
developing countries. See Appendix II for a listing of countries in each group. The raw data are based 
on a dataset containing flow data constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006).  
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e
 
M
I
X
E
D
:
 
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
 
l
i
b
e
r
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
l
y
 
r
a
i
s
e
s
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
i
n
 
m
o
r
e
 
e
t
h
n
i
c
a
l
l
y
 
h
o
m
o
g
e
n
e
o
u
s
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
.
 
 
 
K
l
e
i
n
 
(
2
0
0
5
)
 
7
1
 
1
9
7
6
–
1
9
9
5
 
∆
Y
c
 
C
r
o
s
s
 
s
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
O
L
S
,
 
I
V
,
 
N
L
L
S
 
S
h
a
r
e
 
M
I
X
E
D
:
 
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
 
o
p
e
n
n
e
s
s
 
h
a
s
 
a
 
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
l
l
y
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
i
m
p
a
c
t
 
o
n
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
i
n
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
b
e
t
t
e
r
 
(
n
o
t
 
t
h
e
 
b
e
s
t
)
 
i
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
s
.
 
 
M
o
d
y
 
a
n
d
 
M
u
r
s
h
i
d
 
(
2
0
0
5
)
 
6
0
 
1
9
7
9
–
1
9
9
9
 
I
/
Y
 
A
n
n
u
a
l
 
a
n
d
 
3
-
y
e
a
r
l
y
 
p
a
n
e
l
s
 
F
E
,
 
I
V
,
 
d
y
n
a
m
i
c
 
G
M
M
 
V
o
l
u
m
e
,
 
A
 
S
u
m
 
M
I
X
E
D
:
 
F
D
I
 
h
a
d
 
s
t
r
o
n
g
e
s
t
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
i
m
p
a
c
t
 
o
n
 
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
.
 
P
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
h
i
p
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
f
l
o
w
s
 
a
n
d
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
i
s
 
m
o
r
e
 
e
m
p
h
a
s
i
z
e
d
 
w
i
t
h
 
s
t
r
o
n
g
e
r
 
p
o
l
i
c
i
e
s
.
 
 
 
V
l
a
c
h
o
s
 
a
n
d
 
W
a
l
d
e
n
s
t
r
ö
m
 
(
2
0
0
5
)
 
4
2
 
1
9
8
0
–
1
9
9
0
 
∆
I
N
D
 
C
r
o
s
s
 
s
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
w
i
t
h
 
F
E
,
 
O
L
S
 
a
n
d
 
I
V
 
V
o
l
u
m
e
,
 
B
i
n
a
r
y
 
M
I
X
E
D
:
 
V
a
l
u
e
 
a
d
d
e
d
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
i
n
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
s
 
m
o
r
e
 
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
o
n
 
e
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
e
 
n
o
 
h
i
g
h
e
r
 
p
o
s
t
-
l
i
b
e
r
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
 
b
u
t
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
 
o
n
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
i
n
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
 
a
n
d
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
f
i
r
m
s
.
 
 
K
l
e
i
n
 
a
n
d
 
O
l
i
v
e
i
 
(
2
0
0
6
)
 
7
0
 
1
9
7
6
–
1
9
9
5
 
∆
Y
c
 
 
C
r
o
s
s
 
s
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
O
L
S
,
 
,
I
V
 
S
h
a
r
e
 
M
I
X
E
D
:
 
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
e
d
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
o
p
e
n
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
s
 
e
n
j
o
y
e
d
 
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
a
n
d
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
d
e
e
p
e
n
i
n
g
 
(
w
i
t
h
 
l
a
t
t
e
r
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
 
n
o
t
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
 
f
o
r
 
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
i
n
g
 
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
s
)
.
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N
o
t
e
s
:
 
 
 
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
:
 
 
E
B
I
T
D
A
:
 
E
a
r
n
i
n
g
s
 
B
e
f
o
r
e
 
I
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
,
 
T
a
x
e
s
,
 
D
e
p
r
e
c
i
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
A
m
o
r
t
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
;
 
∆
G
N
P
c
:
 
G
r
o
w
t
h
 
r
a
t
e
 
o
f
 
r
e
a
l
 
p
e
r
-
c
a
p
i
t
a
 
G
N
P
;
 
I
:
 
I
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
;
 
I
/
Y
:
 
I
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
o
v
e
r
 
G
D
P
;
 
∆
I
c
:
 
G
r
o
w
t
h
 
r
a
t
e
 
i
n
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
p
e
r
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
;
 
∆
I
N
D
:
 
G
r
o
w
t
h
 
r
a
t
e
 
o
f
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
-
l
e
v
e
l
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
,
 
e
.
g
.
,
 
r
e
a
l
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
a
d
d
e
d
,
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
 
o
r
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
f
i
r
m
s
;
 
∆
l
n
I
:
 
G
r
o
w
t
h
 
r
a
t
e
 
o
f
 
r
e
a
l
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
;
 
S
/
Y
:
 
S
a
v
i
n
g
 
o
v
e
r
 
G
D
P
;
 
∆
T
F
P
:
 
G
r
o
w
t
h
 
r
a
t
e
 
o
f
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
f
a
c
t
o
r
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
;
 
∆
Y
c
:
 
G
r
o
w
t
h
 
r
a
t
e
 
o
f
 
r
e
a
l
 
p
e
r
-
c
a
p
i
t
a
 
G
D
P
;
 
∆
Y
:
 
G
r
o
w
t
h
 
r
a
t
e
 
o
f
 
r
e
a
l
 
G
D
P
.
 
 
R
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
 
m
e
t
h
o
d
o
l
o
g
y
:
 
 
C
r
o
s
s
-
s
e
c
t
i
o
n
:
 
S
i
n
g
l
e
 
o
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
 
f
o
r
 
e
a
c
h
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
o
v
e
r
 
e
n
t
i
r
e
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
;
 
F
E
:
 
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
a
n
d
/
o
r
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
f
i
x
e
d
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
;
 
G
M
M
:
 
G
e
n
e
r
a
l
i
z
e
d
 
M
e
t
h
o
d
 
o
f
 
M
o
m
e
n
t
s
;
 
I
V
:
 
I
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
a
l
 
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
;
 
N
L
L
S
:
 
N
o
n
-
L
i
n
e
a
r
 
L
e
a
s
t
 
S
q
u
a
r
e
s
;
 
O
L
S
:
 
O
r
d
i
n
a
r
y
 
L
e
a
s
t
 
S
q
u
a
r
e
s
;
 
P
a
n
e
l
:
 
R
e
p
e
a
t
e
d
 
o
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
o
n
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
(
o
r
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
e
s
)
 
o
b
s
e
r
v
e
d
 
o
v
e
r
 
m
u
l
t
i
p
l
e
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
s
 
(
w
h
i
c
h
 
m
a
y
 
b
e
,
 
f
o
r
 
e
x
a
m
p
l
e
,
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
,
 
f
i
v
e
 
y
e
a
r
s
 
o
r
 
a
 
d
e
c
a
d
e
)
;
 
P
o
o
l
e
d
:
 
A
s
s
u
m
e
s
 
n
o
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
-
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
 
f
i
x
e
d
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
;
 
R
E
:
 
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
r
a
n
d
o
m
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
;
 
S
U
R
:
 
S
e
e
m
i
n
g
l
y
 
U
n
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
 
R
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
;
 
W
L
S
:
 
W
e
i
g
h
t
e
d
 
L
e
a
s
t
 
S
q
u
a
r
e
s
.
 
 
F
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
o
p
e
n
n
e
s
s
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
:
 
 
A
 
S
u
m
:
 
S
u
m
 
o
f
 
f
o
u
r
 
b
i
n
a
r
y
 
A
R
E
A
E
R
 
l
i
b
e
r
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
 
a
c
r
o
s
s
 
t
h
e
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
 
c
a
t
e
g
o
r
i
e
s
 
–
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
;
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
;
 
e
x
p
o
r
t
 
p
r
o
c
e
e
d
s
 
a
n
d
 
m
u
l
t
i
p
l
e
 
e
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
r
a
t
e
s
;
 
B
i
n
a
r
y
:
 
0
/
1
 
d
u
m
m
y
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
f
r
o
m
 
A
R
E
A
E
R
 
t
a
k
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
o
f
 
o
n
e
 
w
h
e
n
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
 
i
n
 
p
l
a
c
e
;
 
K
S
:
 
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
 
b
a
s
e
d
 
o
n
 
K
a
m
i
n
s
k
y
 
a
n
d
 
S
c
h
m
u
k
l
e
r
 
(
2
0
0
3
)
;
 
Q
u
i
n
n
:
 
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
 
b
a
s
e
d
 
o
n
 
Q
u
i
n
n
 
(
1
9
9
7
)
;
 
∆
Q
u
i
n
n
:
 
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
Q
u
i
n
n
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
;
 
S
h
a
r
e
:
 
T
h
e
 
p
r
o
p
o
r
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
y
e
a
r
s
 
i
n
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
h
a
d
 
l
i
b
e
r
a
l
i
z
e
d
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
s
 
b
a
s
e
d
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
b
i
n
a
r
y
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
f
r
o
m
 
A
R
E
A
E
R
;
 
S
M
L
D
:
 
O
f
f
i
c
i
a
l
 
D
a
t
e
 
o
f
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
M
a
r
k
e
t
 
L
i
b
e
r
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
;
 
V
o
l
u
m
e
:
 
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
b
a
s
e
d
 
o
n
 
a
c
t
u
a
l
 
f
l
o
w
s
/
s
t
o
c
k
s
 
o
f
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
f
l
o
w
s
.
 
 
M
a
i
n
 
f
i
n
d
i
n
g
s
:
 
N
O
 
E
F
F
E
C
T
:
 
N
o
 
e
v
i
d
e
n
c
e
 
o
f
 
a
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
 
o
f
 
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
i
n
t
e
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
n
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
;
 
M
I
X
E
D
:
 
E
v
i
d
e
n
c
e
 
o
f
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
 
o
f
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
i
n
t
e
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
n
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
i
s
 
c
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
u
p
o
n
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
(
f
o
r
 
e
x
a
m
p
l
e
,
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
 
o
r
 
h
u
m
a
n
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
)
 
o
r
 
o
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
 
n
o
n
-
r
o
b
u
s
t
 
(
f
o
r
 
e
x
a
m
p
l
e
,
 
c
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
o
n
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
s
)
;
 
P
O
S
I
T
I
V
E
:
 
S
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
 
o
f
 
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
i
n
t
e
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
n
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
.
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T
a
b
l
e
 
4
B
.
 
S
u
m
m
a
r
y
 
o
f
 
K
e
y
 
E
m
p
i
r
i
c
a
l
 
S
t
u
d
i
e
s
 
o
n
 
E
q
u
i
t
y
 
M
a
r
k
e
t
 
L
i
b
e
r
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
G
r
o
w
t
h
 
 
S
t
u
d
y
 
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
C
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
/
 
T
i
m
e
 
P
e
r
i
o
d
 
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
 
/
 
R
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
 
M
e
t
h
o
d
o
l
o
g
y
 
 
F
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
O
p
e
n
n
e
s
s
 
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
 
M
a
i
n
 
F
i
n
d
i
n
g
s
 
 
 
H
e
n
r
y
 
(
2
0
0
0
)
 
1
1
 
1
9
7
7
–
1
9
9
4
 
∆
l
n
I
 
A
n
n
u
a
l
 
p
a
n
e
l
 
F
E
 
S
M
L
D
 
P
O
S
I
T
I
V
E
:
 
P
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
o
f
 
r
e
a
l
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
 
s
t
o
c
k
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
 
l
i
b
e
r
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
.
 
 
B
e
k
a
e
r
t
,
 
H
a
r
v
e
y
 
a
n
d
 
L
u
n
d
b
l
a
d
 
(
2
0
0
1
)
 
3
0
 
1
9
8
0
–
1
9
9
7
 
∆
Y
c
 
5
-
y
e
a
r
l
y
 
p
a
n
e
l
 
G
M
M
 
(
o
v
e
r
l
a
p
p
i
n
g
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
s
)
 
S
M
L
D
 
P
O
S
I
T
I
V
E
:
 
P
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
 
o
n
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
 
e
q
u
i
t
y
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
 
l
i
b
e
r
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
i
s
 
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
 
f
o
r
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
a
b
o
v
e
 
m
e
d
i
a
n
 
e
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
l
e
v
e
l
s
.
 
 
L
i
 
(
2
0
0
3
)
 
9
5
 
1
9
7
5
–
2
0
0
0
 
∆
Y
c
,
 
I
/
Y
,
 
∆
Y
c
/
∆
I
c
 
A
n
n
u
a
l
 
p
a
n
e
l
 
F
E
,
 
I
V
 
S
M
L
D
 
P
O
S
I
T
I
V
E
:
 
P
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
i
m
p
a
c
t
 
o
f
 
o
p
e
n
i
n
g
 
e
q
u
i
t
y
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
s
 
d
u
e
 
m
a
i
n
l
y
 
t
o
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
 
c
h
a
n
n
e
l
 
(
∆
Y
c
/
∆
I
c
)
 
i
n
 
m
i
d
d
l
e
-
 
a
n
d
 
h
i
g
h
-
i
n
c
o
m
e
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
t
o
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
a
c
c
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
(
I
/
Y
)
 
i
n
 
l
o
w
-
i
n
c
o
m
e
.
 
 
B
e
k
a
e
r
t
,
 
H
a
r
v
e
y
 
a
n
d
 
L
u
n
d
b
l
a
d
 
(
2
0
0
5
)
 
9
5
 
1
9
8
0
–
1
9
9
7
 
∆
Y
c
 
5
-
y
e
a
r
l
y
 
p
a
n
e
l
 
p
o
o
l
e
d
 
O
L
S
;
 
5
-
y
e
a
r
l
y
 
p
a
n
e
l
 
(
o
v
e
r
l
a
p
p
i
n
g
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
s
)
 
G
M
M
,
 
I
V
 
S
M
L
D
 
P
O
S
I
T
I
V
E
:
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Figure 1. Gross International Financial Assets and Liabilities, 1970–2004 
(trillions of U.S. dollars) 
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Figure 2. Gross International Financial Liabilities of Developing Economies, 1970–2004 
(trillions of U.S. dollars) 
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charts show how the components add up to the total integration measure in each period. Debt includes both 
official and unofficial debt. The category "Other" includes financial derivatives and total reserves minus gold. 
See the Data Appendix for a listing of countries in each group.  - 65 -   
 
Figure 3. Evolution of International Financial Integration, 1970–2004 
 
Notes: This figure shows unweighted cross-country averages, within each group, of two measures of capital 
account openness. The de jure measure is based on the IMF 0-1 capital account restrictiveness classification, 
with 1 representing countries that have open capital accounts. The de facto measure is based on the ratio of 
gross stocks of foreign assets and liabilities to GDP, with the raw data taken from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
(2006). See the Data Appendix for a listing of countries in each group.
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Figure 4. GDP (per capita, PPP weighted), 1970–2004 
 
Notes: This plot shows cumulative changes in indexes of per capita GDP for each group of countries, computed 
using growth rates of real GDP for each country and weighting these by a PPP adjustment factor. The indexes 
are set to 100 in the base period. See the Data Appendix for a listing of countries in each group.
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Figure 5A. Level of Financial Openness and GDP Growth, 1985–2004 
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Figure 5B. Change in Financial Openness and GDP Growth, 1985–2004 
 
Notes: Growth refers to the average real per capita GDP growth. Financial openness is defined as the ratio of 
gross stocks of foreign assets and liabilities to GDP and is based on a dataset constructed by Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2006). The second panel uses residuals from a cross-section regression of growth on initial income, 
population growth, human capital and the investment rate. See Appendix II for abbreviated country names.
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Figure 6A. Financial Openness and Financial Development, 1985–2004 
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Figure 6B. Financial Openness and Institutional Quality, 1985–2004 
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Figure 6C. Financial Openness and Macroeconomic Policies, 1985–2004 
 
Notes: The financial integration data are based on a dataset constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006). 
Financial Development data are taken from Beck and Al-Hussainy (2006). Private Credit refers to credit given 
to the private sector by deposit money banks and Stock Market Capitalization is defined as the value of listed 
shares. Institutional quality data are from Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi (2005) and 
cover the period 1996-2004. Institutional Quality is the average of the following indicators: Voice and 
Accountability, Political Stability, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of 
Corruption. Monetary and fiscal data are from the World Bank's World Development Indicators and the IMF's 
International Financial Statistics and World Economic Outlook databases. Inflation is defined as the annual 
change in CPI. Government Budget Balance is the difference between government revenues and government 
expenditures. See Appendix II for abbreviated country names.
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APPENDIXES 
 
I. Capital Controls 
 
As we discuss in the text, a number of papers in the literature use de jure measures of 
financial openness that are mostly based on the extent of various forms of capital controls. 
This appendix provides some basic information about de jure capital controls and their 
measurement in practice. We first analyze the main categories of capital controls. Next, we 
discuss how detailed capital control measures are presented in the main data sources and 
explain how these measures are utilized in empirical studies. We conclude with a brief 
discussion about the overlap between capital controls and prudential measures. 
 
A. Capital Controls: Direct Versus Indirect Controls 
 
Controls on capital account transactions can be studied under two main categories: direct (or 
administrative) controls and indirect (market-based) controls. Direct controls are associated 
with administrative measures, such as direct prohibitions, explicit limits on the volume of 
transactions, or approval procedures to limit capital account transactions. These controls 
often aim at restricting the volume of financial flows.  
 
Indirect (or market-based) capital controls include dual or multiple exchange rate systems, 
explicit or implicit taxation of cross-border financial flows (e.g., Tobin taxes), and other— 
mainly price-based—measures. While these measures primarily affect the price of a financial 
transaction, they could also affect the volume (see Ariyoshi and others 2000). 
 
B. Measuring Capital Controls 
 
Capital control measures in most of the studies discussed in the text are based on the 
information provided by the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions (AREAER). Since 1996, the AREAER publishes detailed descriptions about 
exchange rate policies, arrangements for payments and receipts, and controls on capital 
transactions of each member country of the IMF. The publication also includes a summary 
table of codes about the features of exchange rate arrangements and regulatory frameworks 
for current and capital account transactions. The main categories relating to exchange rate 
arrangements and regulatory frameworks for current account transactions are as follows 
(these are drawn from the compilation guide of the 2005 AREAER): 
 
•  Exchange rate arrangements: Various categories of arrangements, including regimes 
such as pegged exchange rate, crawling band, and independently floating rates. 
•  Exchange rate structure: Dual versus multiple exchange rates. 
•  Arrangements for payments and receipts: Bilateral and regional arrangements for 
international payments and receipts; controls on exports and imports of gold and 
banknotes.   - 71 -   
 
•  Resident/nonresident accounts: Regulations about the nature and operation of 
different types of accounts. 
•  Imports and import payments/Exports and export proceeds: Restrictions on the nature 
and extent of exchange and trade restrictions on imports/Restrictions on the use of 
export proceeds, as well as regulations on exports.  
•  Payments for (Proceeds from) invisible transactions and current transfers: Procedures 
and regulations governing a wide set of payments, such as trade- and investment-
related payments, and repatriation requirements from various transactions and 
transfers. 
In addition, the summary table provides information about controls and provisions involving 
capital account transactions in the following 13 categories: 
 
•  Capital market securities: Shares and other securities of a participating nature, and 
bonds and other securities with an original maturity of more than one year. 
•  Money market instruments: Securities with an original maturity of one year or less, 
such as certificates of deposit and bills of exchange. 
•  Collective investment securities: Share certificates and registry entries or other 
evidence of investor interest in an institution for collective investment, such as mutual 
funds and investment trusts. 
•  Derivatives and other instruments: Refers to operations in other negotiable 
instruments and nonsecuritized claims not covered under the subsections above. 
•  Commercial credits: Covers operations directly linked to international trade 
transactions or with the rendering of international services. 
•  Financial credits: Includes credits other than commercial credits granted by all 
residents, including banks, to nonresidents, or vice versa. 
•  Guarantees, sureties, and financial backup facilities: Includes those provided by 
residents to nonresidents and vice versa. Also includes securities pledged for payment 
of a contract, such as warrants, performance bonds, and letters of credit. 
•  Direct investment: Refers to investments for the purpose of establishing lasting 
economic relations both abroad by residents and domestically by nonresidents.  
•  Liquidation of direct investment: Refers to the transfer of principal, including the 
initial capital and capital gains, of a direct investment defined above. 
•  Real estate transactions: Refers to the acquisition of real estate not associated with 
direct investment, including, for example, investments of a purely financial nature in 
real estate or the acquisition of real estate for personal use.    - 72 -   
 
•  Personal capital transactions: Transfers initiated on behalf of private persons and 
intended to benefit other private persons, e.g., gifts, endowments, loans, inheritances. 
•  Provisions specific to commercial banks and other credit institutions: Describes 
regulations that are specific to these institutions, such as monetary, prudential 
controls, and foreign exchange controls. 
•  Provisions specific to institutional investors: Describes controls specific to 
institutions such as insurance companies and pension funds, such as a limit on the 
share of the institution’s portfolio that may be held in foreign assets. 
Since most of the de jure based studies we cite draw on the AREAER issues published before 
1996, it is important to note that the coverage in prior years was similar in scope, but less 
detailed.
59 For example, before 1996, the summary table of codes presented information 
about restrictions involving payments, exports and imports in only six categories: 
 
•  Restrictions on payments on capital account transactions 
•  Restrictions on payments for current account transactions 
•  Bilateral payments arrangements with members and nonmembers 
•  Import surcharges 
•  Advance imports deposits 
•  Surrender/repatriation requirements for export proceeds 
The information in the AREAER has been used to produce various de jure measures of 
financial openness (see Edison et. al., 2004). Most of the studies first produce a binary 
measure of financial openness based on the information in the line labeled “Restrictions of 
payments on capital account transactions” in the summary table. This binary measure is then 
used to generate a “share” variable measuring the proportion of years in which countries had 
no restrictions on payments on capital accounts (see Grilli and Milessi-Ferretti, 1995 and 
Rodrik, 1998). Other studies consider more comprehensive de jure measures by analyzing the 
information content of other lines in the AREAER involving restrictions on payments on 
current account transactions, exchange rate arrangements, and surrender requirements of 
export proceeds in addition to restrictions on payments on capital account transactions (see 
Chinn and Ito, 2005). Instead of just relying on the summary table, some others construct 
measures by translating the information content of the narrative descriptions in the AREAER 
into binary variables (see Quinn, 1997). As we discuss in the text, there are advantages and 
disadvantages associated with each of these measures.  
 
                                                 
59 Miniane (2004) extends the summary measures of disaggregated capital controls in the AREAER’s 
post-1996 format back to 1983 for a small group of countries.   - 73 -   
 
 
 
C. Capital Controls and Prudential Measures 
 
In addition to the long-list of problems involving de jure measures that are discussed in the 
text, a further complication is that these measures are unable to capture the full extent of 
controls since they do not necessarily differentiate a prudential measure from a capital 
control even though some prudential policies could effectively restrict capital flows (see Ishii 
et. al., 2002). For example, prudential measures such as reserve and deposit requirements, 
maturity restrictions, reporting requirements, limits on the use of derivatives can be 
considered capital controls under certain circumstances. Some prudential measures include 
treating deposit accounts held by residents and nonresidents differently by imposing 
discriminatory reserve requirements and interest rate controls. Reporting requirements for 
specific transactions are also employed to monitor and control capital movements (e.g., 
derivative transactions, non-trade-related transactions with nonresidents).  
   - 74 -   
 
II. Data 
 
This appendix lists the countries included in the analysis and also indicates the acronyms 
used for each country. The full sample of 71 countries is divided into three groups.
60  
 
A. Advanced Economies 
 
The 21 advanced industrial economies in our sample are Australia (AUS), Austria (AUT), 
Belgium (BEL), Canada (CAN), Denmark (DNK), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Germany 
(DEU), Greece (GRC), Ireland (IRL), Italy (ITA), Japan (JPN), the Netherlands (NLD), New 
Zealand (NZL), Norway (NOR), Portugal (PRT), Spain (ESP), Sweden (SWE), Switzerland 
(CHE), the United Kingdom (GBR), and the United States (USA). 
 
B. Emerging Market Economies 
 
This group includes 20 countries—Argentina (ARG), Brazil (BRA), Chile (CHL), China 
(CHN), Colombia (COL), Egypt (EGY), India (IND), Indonesia (IDN), Israel (ISR), the 
Republic of Korea (KOR), Malaysia (MYS), Mexico (MEX), Pakistan (PAK), Peru (PER), 
the Philippines (PHL), Singapore (SGP), South Africa (ZAF), Thailand (THA), Turkey 
(TUR), and Venezuela (VEN). 
 
C. Other Developing Economies 
 
This group has 30 countries—Algeria (DZA), Bangladesh (BGD), Bolivia (BOL), Cameroon 
(CMR), Costa Rica (CRI), the Dominican Republic (DOM), Ecuador (ECU), El Salvador 
(SLV), Fiji (FJI), Ghana (GHA), Guatemala (GTM), Honduras (HND), Iran (IRN), Jamaica 
(JAM), Kenya (KEN), Malawi (MWI), Mauritius (MUS), Nepal (NPL), Niger (NER), Papua 
New Guinea (PNG), Paraguay (PRY), Senegal (SEN), Sri Lanka (LKA), Tanzania (TZA), 
Togo (TGO), Trinidad and Tobago (TTO), Tunisia (TUN), Uruguay (URY), Zambia (ZMB), 
and Zimbabwe (ZWE). 
                                                 
60 For presentational reasons, in Figures 5 and 6 we excluded the following countries that were 
outliers: the United Kingdom (GBR), the Netherlands (NLD), Belgium (BEL), Singapore (SGP), 
Switzerland (CHE), Ireland (IRL), Zambia (ZMB), and China (CHN). Inclusion of outliers did not 
change our qualitative findings.    - 75 -   
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